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Nevertheless She Persisted: 
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Catherine Martin Christopher* 
There is a longstanding and popular sentiment in the legal profession 
that oral arguments do not really matter; rather, everything rides on the 
written briefs.  This Article takes that old adage head on, and does so through 
analysis of one of the most controversial cases ever decided by the United 
States Supreme Court: Roe v. Wade.  It is a little-known fact that Roe was 
argued before the Court not once, but twice, which presents a unique 
opportunity to consider the place and power of oral arguments in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence. 
This Article offers a comprehensive analysis and critique of the two 
oral arguments in Roe.  The Article first analyzes the oral arguments 
pragmatically, undertaking a scholarly investigation of the arguments to 
investigate their impact on the majority opinion.  Next, the Article proceeds 
theoretically, engaging in a feminist legal theory analysis to assess how the 
Roe arguments were both a product of their time and shaped feminist legal 
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Be brief, be pointed; let your matter stand 
Lucid in order, solid, and at hand; 
Spend not your words on trifles, but condense; 
Strike with the mass of thought, not drops of sense[.]1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Conventional wisdom among Supreme Court observers is that oral 
arguments do not impact the Justices’ decisions.  Besides being illogical—
why would the Court hold oral arguments if they were a waste of time?—
this conventional wisdom is contradicted by the Justices’ own statements and 
data-driven research.2 
Oral arguments are perhaps the Justices’ most significant avenue of 
independent information-gathering.3  Aside from any independent research 
 
 1  Joseph Story, Advice to a Young Lawyer, in 4 A LIBRARY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE: 
AN ANTHOLOGY IN ELEVEN VOLUMES, LITERATURE OF THE REPUBLIC, PART I., 
CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD, 1788–1820, 5 (E.C. Stedman & E.M. Hutchinson eds., 1891), 
www.bartleby.com/400/poem/767.html. 
 2  TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND DECISION MAKING ON THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT 2 (2004). 
 3  Id.  
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the Justices and their clerks conduct, too much of which is time-prohibitive, 
all information the Justices have is what the advocates and amici put in front 
of them.4  Oral arguments also present a key opportunity for the Justices to 
signal to each other which way they are leaning and coordinate about final 
policy outcomes.5 
Naturally, oral arguments are not the sole, or even the most significant, 
determiner of case outcomes.6  But Justices have consistently, and 
repeatedly, asserted that oral arguments can and do affect their decisions in 
cases: 
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.: I have had too many occasions 
when my judgment of a decision has turned on what happened in 
oral argument. . . .  Often my idea of how a case shapes up is 
changed by oral argument.7 
Justice William Rehnquist: I think that in a significant minority of 
cases in which I have heard oral argument, I have left the bench 
feeling different about the case than I did when I came on the 
bench.  The change is seldom a full one-hundred-and-eighty-
degree swing.8 
Justice William O. Douglas: The purpose of a hearing is that the 
Court may learn what it does not know . . . .  It is the education of 
the Justices . . . that is the essential function of the appellate 
lawyer.9 
Roe v. Wade,10 certainly one of the most controversial Supreme Court 
cases in history, was argued before the Supreme Court not only once, but 
twice.  The first argument was held on December 13, 1971, and the second 
on October 11, 1972.11  Few cases are argued twice, but interestingly, those 
that are turn out to be tremendously significant cases; for example, Roe v. 
Wade, Brown v. Board of Education,12 and Baker v. Carr13 were all argued 
 
 4  Id. at 143 n.19. 
 5  Id. at 61. 
 6  See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL 
CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 7–8 (1992) (debunking the ideas that the 
personalities of the Supreme Court Justices, the “climate of the times,” or the types of litigants 
who come before the Court determine case outcomes, and concluding instead that “it is the 
law and legal arguments as framed by legal actors that most clearly influence the content and 
direction of legal change”) (emphasis in original). 
 7  JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 15.  
 8  Id. at 15. 
 9  Id. at 16. 
 10  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 11  Roe v. Wade, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-18 (last visited Nov. 15, 
2018). 
 12  347 U.S. 483 (1954) (argued Dec. 9–11, 1952; reargued Dec. 7–9, 1953). 
 13  369 U.S. 186 (1962) (argued Apr. 19–20, 1961; reargued Oct. 9, 1961).  In an 
interview after his retirement, Chief Justice Earl Warren was asked which case that he 
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twice. 
This Article undertakes a deep analysis of both sets of the Roe v. Wade 
oral arguments.  Part II summarizes, compares, and contrasts both sets of 
oral arguments.  This Part also critiques the effective and ineffective oral 
advocacy and narrative framing techniques used during the oral arguments.  
Part III examines the final majority opinion and traces key points from that 
opinion back to the briefs and the oral arguments, thus identifying whether 
moments at oral argument germinated into significant features of the 
opinion.  Part IV deconstructs and contextualizes the oral arguments through 
various lenses of feminist legal theory, analyzing how the framing of Roe 
was both a product of its time and a shaping force in the feminist legal theory 
that developed after the decision.  Part V concludes by discussing how the 
Roe oral arguments and opinion are full of contradictions.  During the oral 
arguments, the advocates and Justices used gendered language to discuss a 
due process analysis, even though due process is not implicated in gender 
discrimination issues.  The oral arguments and the majority opinion are also 
problematic from a feminist legal theory standpoint because they define the 
rights of women by articulating the rights of men, and by finding a 
constitutionally protected right while denying autonomous decision-making 
by the right-holders. 
II. SUMMARY OF THE ORAL ARGUMENTS 
The statute at issue in Roe v. Wade was a Texas law prohibiting doctors 
from performing abortions except to save the life of the pregnant woman: 
If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant woman or 
knowingly procure to be administered with her consent any drug 
or medicine, or shall use towards her any violence or means 
whatever externally or internally applied, and thereby procure an 
abortion, he shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two 
nor more than five years; if it be done without her consent, the 
punishment shall be doubled.  By “abortion” is meant that the life 
of the fetus or embryo shall be destroyed in the woman’s womb 
or that a premature birth thereof be caused.14 
Nothing in this chapter applies to an abortion procured or 
attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of 
the mother.15 
 
participated in was the most significant.  He replied, not Brown, Miranda, Gideon, Griswold, 
or any of the other cases decided between 1953 and 1969—but Baker, which held that 
redistricting for state elected officials is not a political question, and can be reviewed by the 
Supreme Court.  See More Perfect: The Political Thicket, WNYC STUDIOS (June 9, 2016), 
https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/the-political-thicket. 
 14  TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1191 (repealed 1973).  
 15  § 1196 (repealed 1973).  Related statutes, §§ 1192–95, were also challenged. 
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A. The Road to the Courtroom 
Before arriving at the United States Supreme Court as Roe v. Wade, the 
case began as two separate actions in the Northern District of Texas.  Jane 
Roe, the now-famous plaintiff, filed one suit alleging that the Texas statute 
violated several fundamental personal rights.16  John Hallford, a Texas 
physician who performed abortions, later intervened in her case.17  The other 
case was brought by John and Mary Doe, a married couple who did not have 
and did not want children.18  Mrs. Doe had an unspecified medical condition 
and had been advised by her physician not to get pregnant or to take birth 
control pills; the Does alleged that the Texas abortion statute interfered with 
their marital relations because they would be unable to obtain an abortion if 
Mrs. Doe became pregnant.19 
The cases were consolidated and heard as one before a three-judge 
District Court panel.20  The District Court panel found nearly entirely in favor 
of Plaintiffs Roe and Hallford.21  The District Court found that the Does 
lacked standing to sue and dismissed their case.22  The District Court 
declared the statute unconstitutional on the grounds of vagueness and 
infringement of a woman’s Ninth Amendment right to abortion,23 and it 
granted declaratory relief as to Plaintiffs Roe and Hallford.24  The District 
Court declined, however, to grant injunctive relief, presumably because the 
court assumed that prosecutors would not continue to prosecute an 
unconstitutional statute.25 
The next day, however, Henry Wade, the Dallas County District 
Attorney and eventual defendant in this case, gave a press conference 
announcing his intention to continue prosecuting violations of the Texas 
 
 16  See Brief for Appellants at 8–9, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18), 1971 
WL 128054, at *8–9 [hereinafter Brief for Appellants]. 
 17  Id. at *12. 
 18  Id. at *10.  The names John and Mary Doe were, of course, pseudonyms.  The woman 
styled as Mary Doe was, in real life, a friend of Jane Roe’s lead lawyer, Sarah Weddington.  
Telephone Interview with Sarah Weddington, Professor of History, University of Texas 
(retired) (Feb. 18, 2018). 
 19  Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at 10. 
 20  Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973). 
 21  See id. at 1225.  
 22  Id. 
 23  The Ninth Amendment provides, “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. IX. The District Court found that the Ninth Amendment provided protection for 
individual rights, including a woman’s right to abortion.  See Roe, 314 F. Supp. at 1225. 
 24  Roe, 314 F. Supp. at 1225.  
 25  See id. 
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statute, completely disregarding the District Court’s ruling.26  Roe’s lawyer, 
Sarah Weddington, later mused that Wade may not have meant to help her 
case, but he did—the District Court’s refusal to grant injunctive relief would 
not have been appealable to the Supreme Court if Wade had kept his mouth 
shut.27 
Roe, Hallford, and the Does appealed directly to the Supreme Court on 
the grounds that the District Court had erred both in dismissing the Does’ 
case and denying injunctive relief.28  The State of Texas, through Henry 
Wade, also appealed, but was styled as the appellee.29 
Appellants’ brief to the Supreme Court advanced several arguments 
why the Texas abortion statute should be struck down, two of which were 
discussed extensively at oral argument.  First, Appellants argued that the 
statute abridged their fundamental personal rights by restricting access to 
abortion.30  Second, Appellants asserted that the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague and indefinite because doctors could not know 
whether an abortion which would benefit the woman’s health (physical or 
mental) would also necessarily save her life.31  Appellee filed a brief 
asserting a lack of standing and justiciability, that the statute was not 
overbroad or vague, that the Constitution did not guarantee a woman’s right 
to abortion, and that the State of Texas had an interest in prohibiting 
abortions except in “limited circumstances.”32  In addition to the parties’ 
briefs, Justice Harry Blackmun would later bemoan the number of amicus 
briefs—there were fifteen33—calling the number “voluminous” and claiming 
 
 26  Dave McNeely, Wade to Continue Abortion Trials, DALL. MORNING NEWS, June 19, 
1970, at D1. 
 27  Telephone Interview with Sarah Weddington, Professor of History, University of 
Texas (retired) (Feb. 18, 2018).  A failure to grant injunctive relief “in any civil action, suit 
or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court 
of three judges” may be appealed directly to the Supreme Court.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1948). 
 28  Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at 1–2. 
 29  It is unclear why, but the parties and the Court consistently used the terms “Appellant” 
and “Appellee” in this case, instead of the usual “Petitioner” and “Respondent.” 
 30  Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at 10. 
 31  Id. at 15. 
 32  Brief for Appellee at 7–9, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18), 1971 WL 
134281, at *7–9 [hereinafter Brief for Appellee].  The full briefs contain numerous arguments 
that did not ultimately interest or influence the Justices, as evidenced by the fact that those 
arguments were not raised at either of the oral arguments nor did they find their way into the 
final opinion.  For example, Appellants advanced an argument in their brief that the Texas 
abortion statute violated the physician’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and 
the presumption of innocence.  Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at 143.  Arguments 
asserted in the briefs but not raised at oral argument or included in the majority opinion will 
not be discussed extensively in this Article. 
 33  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 115 (1973).  One author expressed the complaint of a 
Chicago lawyer who planned to submit an amicus brief on behalf of 222 physicians, but never 
did: “[T]his avalanche of amici briefs will probably go for naught since [the Justices] will not 
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that “we’re overwhelmed.”34 
B. The First Oral Arguments: December 13, 1971 
1. For Appellants Roe, et al.: Sarah Weddington 
During the first oral argument, on December 13, 1971, Sarah 
Weddington took the podium before the Supreme Court for Appellants.35  
Most resources that provide advice to appellate oral advocates stress that an 
advocate should be absolutely certain of what he or she is asking for, and 
should offer carefully selected reasons that support his or her position.36  
Weddington, however, began by reciting the procedural posture of the case, 
eventually including the District Court’s two grounds for finding the Texas 
abortion statute unconstitutional: “First, that the law was impermissibly 
vague, and second, that it violated a woman’s right to continue or terminate 
a pregnancy.”37  These two grounds—the vagueness of the statute and a 
 
be able to read them all.”  DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO 
PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 510–11 (1998).  By comparison, twenty-nine 
briefs were filed in the next major abortion case, Planned Parenthood v. Casey.  See Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Nina Totenberg, Record 
Number of Amicus Briefs Filed in Same-Sex-Marriage Cases, NPR (Apr. 28, 2015), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/04/28/402628280/record-number-of-
amicus-briefs-filed-in-same-sex-marriage-cases (noting that there were 148 amicus briefs in 
Obergefell and 136 in Sebellius).  
 34  Oral Argument at 19:58, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18), 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-18 [hereinafter Oral Argument II].  Oyez provides a 
transcript of oral arguments as well as the audio recording.  In this Article, I have, in some 
instances, disagreed with and therefore departed from the Oyez transcripts.  Naturally, when 
transcribing speech, reasonable minds may differ as to the appropriate placement of 
punctuation, among other things.  See Daniel Libit, Transcribers’ Agony: Frustrated Not by 
What Trump Says but How He Says It, CNBC (Aug. 15, 2016), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/15/transcribers-agony-frustrated-not-by-what-trump-says-
but-how-he-says-it.html.  I have also generally removed “ums,” “ahs,” and verbal stumbles. 
 35  Weddington had been the lawyer on the case from its inception and had resisted efforts 
from other lawyers to substitute another oral advocate.  Telephone Interview with Sarah 
Weddington, Professor of History, University of Texas (retired) (Feb. 18, 2018); see also 
GARROW, supra note 33, 514–17. 
 36  Sayler and Shadel advise, “Be selective, both in the quantity of points you make and 
also their quality.  Get to the main points, prioritize them, and make sure you know when and 
how to use them.”  ROBERT N. SAYLER & MOLLY BISHOP SHADEL, TONGUE-TIED AMERICA: 
REVIVING THE ART OF VERBAL PERSUASION 161 (2d ed. 2011) (emphasis in original).  Garner 
articulates this point a few different ways, suggesting separately that advocates should “[l]imit 
the material [they]’ll try to cover[,]” and should “[f]ormulate the rule for which [their] case 
stands—and be willing to show how the rule would apply by analogy to other cases.”  BRYAN 
A. GARNER, THE WINNING ORAL ARGUMENT: ENDURING PRINCIPLES WITH SUPPORTING 
COMMENTS FROM THE LITERATURE 55, 60 (2d ed. 2009).  See also RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, 
WINNING ON APPEAL: BETTER BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT 325 (2d ed. 2003); DAVID C. 
FREDERICK, THE ART OF ORAL ADVOCACY 81 (2003); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, 
MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES 155–56 (2008). 
 37  Oral Argument at 00:46, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18), 
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woman’s right to abortion—formed the two basic themes of the next half 
hour, but they were not firmly established theses at the beginning or the end 
of her argument. 
First, Weddington asserted that the Texas statute, which provided that 
abortions could only be performed in order to save the woman’s life, was too 
vague: 
We submit that a doctor is not used to being restricted to acting 
only when it’s for the purpose of saving the life of the woman, and 
that health is a continuum which runs into life, and a doctor in our 
state does not know whether he can perform an abortion only 
when death is imminent, or when the woman’s life would be 
shortened.  He does not know if the death must be certain, or if it 
could be an increase in the probability of her death.38 
[I]f a woman comes in alleging that she will commit suicide[,] [i]s 
it then necessary for him to do, or can he do an abortion for the 
purpose of saving her life?39 
During this discussion, Weddington wove in arguments about the standing 
of Appellants John and Mary Doe, a married couple who were not and did 
not seek to become pregnant,40 and distinguished United States v. Vuitch,41 a 
case from the previous term that found a D.C. abortion statute 
constitutional.42  Justice Potter Stewart questioned her about the standing of 
Appellants John Hallford and Jane Roe, as well. 
Throughout, Weddington delivered what amounted to an impassioned 
public policy argument for overturning the Texas statute, painting pictures 
of women in need,43 and noting that those Texas women who could afford to 
were simply traveling to other states to obtain abortions: “It’s so often the 
poor and the disadvantaged in Texas who are not able to escape the effect of 
the law,” she said.44  She emphasized the impact an unwanted pregnancy 
could have on a woman’s body, education, employment, and family life, 
 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-18 [hereinafter Oral Argument I]. 
 38  Id. at 03:22. 
 39  Id. at 04:20. 
 40  Id. at 04:41 (“This brings up the married couple in our case.”). 
 41  402 U.S. 62 (1971). 
 42  Id. at 72–73.  After the Vuitch decision, “in the District [of Columbia], doctors are able 
to exercise their normal matter of judgment, whether or not the health of the woman, mental 
or physical, will be affected.  But in Texas, we tell the doctor that unless he can decide whether 
it’s necessary for the purpose of saving [the woman’s] life, and for no other reason, that he is 
subject to criminal sanctions.”  Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 03:52. 
 43  E.g., Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 13:55 (“I think it’s without question that 
pregnancy to a woman can completely disrupt her life.  Whether she’s unmarried, whether 
she’s pursuing an education, whether she’s pursuing a career, whether she has family 
problems—all of the problems of personal and family life, for a woman, are bound up in the 
problem of abortion.”). 
 44  Id. at 06:07. 
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including legal realities that seem almost bizarre by modern standards: a 
pregnant girl or woman could be required to drop out of high school or 
college, or be required to quit her job, after which she would be unable to 
collect unemployment benefits because the law at the time provided that she 
was not eligible for employment.45  “[P]regnancy to a woman is perhaps one 
of the most determinative aspects of her life.  It disrupts her body, it disrupts 
her education, it disrupts her employment, and it often disrupts her entire 
family life,” Weddington said.46  Weddington also mentioned, but did not 
discuss in much detail, the possibility (and reality) that women would seek 
illegal abortions if legal ones were unavailable.47 
Seventeen minutes into her allotted half-hour, Justice Stewart rather 
pointedly said, “I trust you are going to get to what provisions of the 
Constitution you rely on.”48  Weddington floundered a bit, suggesting—in 
less than two minutes—the Ninth Amendment, then citing a law review 
article and common law precedent, then referencing Griswold v. Connecticut 
and the Ninth Amendment again, before finally offering the liberty interest 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.49  Justice Stewart replied, “And anything else 
that might be applicable.”  Weddington laughingly agreed.50  She could 
not—or would not—commit to a specific constitutional provision that would 
establish such a right.51  At one point, she essentially admitted that she was 
not asserting a concrete position, but spun this as modesty: noting that the 
Griswold Court was “obviously divided” on where the right to privacy rests, 
she said, “I’m a little reluctant to aspire to a wisdom that the Court was not 
in agreement on.”52  The humility here is perhaps understandable, but it again 
underscores a fundamental weakness of the oral argument, that Weddington 
was not articulating a clear legal standard by which the Court could grant the 
relief she was requesting. 
Forty-five years later, Weddington herself remains bothered by this 
exchange.  She knows her answer did not hit a home run, but each 
constitutional provision was included for the benefit of a specific Justice, and 
she did not then—and does not now—feel she could have safely omitted any 
options or committed herself more specifically.53 
 
 45  Id. at 14:17. 
 46  Id. at 15:41. 
 47  Id. at 12:45. 
 48  Id. at 17:21. 
 49  381 U.S. 479 (1965); Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 17:33. 
 50  Id. at 19:27. 
 51  See id. at 19:16 (“We had originally brought the suit alleging [violations of] . . .  the 
Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause, the Ninth Amendment, and a variety of 
others.”).   
 52  Id. at 18:17. 
 53  Telephone Interview with Sarah Weddington, Professor of History, University of 
CHRISTOPHER (DO NOT DELETE) 12/17/2018  4:04 PM 
316 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:307 
The Court’s final majority opinion ultimately articulates the 
constitutional rights of the woman, the lack of constitutional rights of the 
unborn fetus, and the State’s interests in regulating the procedure for the 
protection of the woman’s health and for preserving fetal life.54  Weddington 
was not quite able to tease these interests apart and discuss them with 
confidence.  For example: 
Justice Byron White: The right you insist on [for a woman to 
choose an abortion] reaches right up to the time of birth? 
Weddington: The Constitution, as I read it, and as interpreted and 
documented by Professor Means, attaches protection to the person 
at the time of birth.55 
Here, Weddington confused a question about the rights of the woman with 
the rights of the fetus. 
Twenty-two minutes into the argument, Justice White raised the 
possibility that the length of the pregnancy might be significant: he asked 
whether “the statute doesn’t make any distinction based upon what period of 
pregnancy the abortion is performed.”56  This point had not been raised in 
the briefs, but historically the legality of an abortion often hinged on whether 
it was performed before or after “quickening” of the fetus.57 
Weddington answered accurately that no, the statute did not distinguish 
based on the length of a pregnancy,58 but a few minutes later, she said, 
“Obviously I have a much more difficult time saying that the [S]tate has no 
interest in late pregnancy.”59  Justice White jumped on this: “Why? Why is 
that?”  Weddington was again rather inarticulate in her response, saying, “I 
think it is more the emotional response to a late pregnancy rather than it is 
any constitutional [reason].”60 
Making concessions as an advocate is a tricky business.  Doing so may 
build credibility with the bench, but on the other hand, an advocate does not 
want to give away the case.  “Know what you can and can’t concede,” 
advises Bryan A. Garner.61  And with his coauthor Justice Antonin Scalia, 
“Beware”: “Any judge who presses you for a concession might well use it 
against you.”62  Each advocate at the Roe oral arguments made a key 
 
Texas (retired) (Feb. 18, 2018). 
 54  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158–63 (1973). 
 55  Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 24:02. 
 56  Id. at 22:28. 
 57  See Roe, 410 U.S. at 132–39.  “Quickening” is “the first recognizable movement of a 
fetus in utero, usually appearing from the 16th to the 18th week of pregnancy.”  Id. at 132. 
 58  Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 22:36. 
 59  Id. at 23:34. 
 60  Id. at 23:42. 
 61  GARNER, supra note 36, at 191. 
 62  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 36, at 199.  The authors also caution against conceding 
CHRISTOPHER (DO NOT DELETE) 12/17/2018  4:04 PM 
2019] NEVERTHELESS SHE PERSISTED 317 
concession that was, in fact, used against them.  This was Weddington’s: 
conceding that the State could have greater interest in late pregnancy than in 
early.  As Justice Scalia and Garner predicted, the Court indeed used the 
concession against Appellants, since the final opinion concluded that the 
State has a compelling interest in regulating abortion after the end of the first 
trimester. 
Throughout the first oral argument, Weddington demonstrated broad 
mastery of the subject matter.63  In addition to discussing abortion and related 
statistics in Texas and around the nation, she was able to answer a wide 
variety of questions from the bench, including questions on standing,64 
declaratory judgment law in Texas,65 and whether unborn children can 
recover in other contexts, such as through inheritance and in tort.66  In one 
exchange with Justice White, Weddington was able to cite to an Iowa 
Supreme Court case that had been handed down only two weeks before.67  
Overall, Weddington demonstrated mastery of case law, having apparently 
prepared for every question the Justices might ask, with the exception that 
she proffered no definitive position on where the Constitution protects a right 
to an abortion.68 
Though her voice remained confident throughout, her word choices 
suggested that she was not entirely sure what she was arguing for: “It is our 
position that [pause] the freedom involved is that of a woman to determine 
whether or not to continue a pregnancy.”69  As Weddington drew to a close, 
she recapped rather weakly: “I think perhaps we would stress that there are 
two separate actions before the Court: first, that of the women, and second, 
that of the doctor.”70 
 
points that are not in the briefs.  Id. at 200. 
 63  Oral argument guides are unanimous that thorough preparation is essential.  See, e.g., 
ALDISERT, supra note 36, at 333, 340, 342–43, FREDERICK, supra note 36, at 15; SAYLER & 
SHADEL, supra note 36, at 160; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 36, at 150. 
 64  E.g., Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 25:47. 
 65  Id. at 11:32. 
 66  Id. at 32:40. 
 67  Id. at 33:36. 
 68  Weddington had conducted a moot court only a few days before the first oral 
argument, and she gave tickets to the oral argument as thank you gifts for the lawyers who 
had played the justices.  Telephone Interview with Sarah Weddington, Professor of History, 
University of Texas (retired) (Feb. 18, 2018).  Conventional wisdom holds that moot courts 
are “mandatory” for advocates.  See ALDISERT, supra note 36, at 327; see also GARNER, supra 
note 36, at 45; FREDERICK, supra note 36, at 75; SAYLOR & SHADEL, supra note 36, at 160; 
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 36, at 158.  
 69  Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 23:25. 
 70  Id. at 28:26. 
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2. For Appellee Wade: Jay Floyd 
If Weddington lacked a mantra during her portion of the first oral 
argument, Wade’s advocate, Jay Floyd, appeared hapless.71  When he took 
the podium, Floyd, an Assistant Attorney General, attempted to ingratiate 
himself with the Justices by saying, “It’s an old joke, but when a man argues 
against two beautiful ladies like this, they are going to have the last word.”72 
If Floyd was expecting knowing chuckles from the men on the bench, 
he was disappointed.  There was absolute silence in the courtroom.73  Floyd’s 
opening gambit is now an actual textbook example of what not to do at oral 
argument: in their book on successful appellate advocacy, Justice Scalia and 
Garner warn, “Never tell prepared jokes,” and cite this example for their 
reasoning.74  The audio recording evidences complete silence after Floyd’s 
remark,75 and observers who were in the courtroom reported that Chief 
Justice Warren E. Burger stared disapprovingly at Floyd.76  Sarah 
Weddington later quipped that she thought Floyd “had argued too many 
cases in rural Texas, where a little humor would have been received better.”77 
“The general rule . . . is that humor is for the court and not the 
advocates[,]”78 and indeed, the most amusing moments of the oral arguments 
were at the advocates’ expense.79  Floyd hustled away from his opening faux 
pas by launching into a lengthy assertion that neither Roe nor the Does had 
standing to bring suit.80  He argued that the Does did not have standing 
because they were not pregnant,81 but then incongruously asserted that Roe 
lost her standing when she became pregnant, saying, “I think she makes her 
choice prior to the time she becomes pregnant.”82  Justice White retorted, 
 
 71  See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 6, at 180–81; see also FREDERICK, supra note 36, 
at 169 (“Have a Mantra.”). 
 72  Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 34:17.  Floyd was referring to Weddington and her 
co-counsel, Linda Coffee.  Of course, as appellants who reserved time for rebuttal, 
Weddington and Coffee would have the last word, their beauty notwithstanding. 
 73  Id. at 34:24. 
 74  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 36,  at 186–87; see also Debra Cassens Weiss, Was 
“Beautiful Ladies” Comment in Roe v. Wade the Worst Courtroom Humor of All Time?, 
A.B.A J. (July 30, 2013, 11:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/was_comment 
_in_roe_v._wade_the_worst_courtroom_humor_of_all_time/. 
 75  See Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 34:24. 
 76  GARROW, supra note 33, at 525–26. 
 77  Telephone Interview with Sarah Weddington, Professor of History, University of 
Texas (retired) (Feb. 18, 2018). 
 78  FREDERICK, supra note 36, at 189. 
 79  For example, during Weddington’s argument, Justice Stewart suggested that she was 
asserting any and all constitutional provisions that might apply, and Weddington laughingly 
agreed.  See supra text accompanying note 50. 
 80  See Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 34:45. 
 81  Id. at 37:40. 
 82  Id. at 41:55. 
CHRISTOPHER (DO NOT DELETE) 12/17/2018  4:04 PM 
2019] NEVERTHELESS SHE PERSISTED 319 
“Maybe she makes her choice when she lives in Texas,” and the courtroom 
erupted in laughter.83  As the laughter peaked, Floyd, sounding affronted 
(though he may have been affecting it), asked, “May I proceed?”84  After the 
laughter died down, he suggested, “There is no restriction on moving,” but 
that line did not get an audible reaction.85 
When asked by Justice Thurgood Marshall what the State’s interest was 
in regulating abortion, Floyd bumbled a bit before reciting that the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals had ruled that the State’s interest was in the 
protection of fetal life.86  He hinted that the State had an interest in protecting 
the health of the woman, but never said so directly.  Instead, Floyd said he 
was not convinced by the information on the record that abortion is safer 
than childbirth, nor that women do not experience emotional problems after 
having an abortion.87  He did not explain how his personal skepticism about 
the medical evidence affects the constitutional analysis at hand. 
As happened in the half-hour before (and would happen again during 
the reargument), the Justices extracted an important concession when Floyd 
was forced to admit that “I don’t think the courts have come to the conclusion 
that the unborn has full juristic rights. . . .  I just don’t feel like they have, at 
the present time.”88  Again here, Floyd phrases this as a personal belief rather 
than a fact, which probably did not help his credibility with the bench. 
Throughout the oral argument, Floyd seemed to articulate numerous 
positions that contradicted each other.  In addition to his assertion that neither 
pregnant nor non-pregnant women had standing, he alternately argued that 
life begins at conception, but he did not know when life began for the 
purposes of the abortion statute, saying, “Mr. Justice, there are unanswerable 
questions in this field”—again, to audible chuckling in the gallery.89 
 
 
 83  Id. at 42:15. 
 84  Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 42:23. 
 85  Id. at 42:33. 
 86  Id. at 47:50. 
 87  Id. at 53:33 (“The protection of the mother, at one time, may still be the primary 
[purpose of the abortion statute], but the policy considerations, Mr. Justice, would seem to me 
to be for the State legislature to make a decision.”). 
 88  Id. at 55:10. 
 89  Id. at 56:23.  Justice Marshall: “[Does the fetus have rights i]n the first few weeks of 
pregnancy?”  Floyd: “At any time, Mr. Justice.  We make no distinctions in our statute.”  
Justice Marshall: “You make no distinctions whether there’s life there or not?”  Floyd: “We 
say there is life from the moment of impregnation.”  Justice Marshall: “And do you have any 
scientific data to support that?”  Floyd: “Well, we begin, Mr. Justice, in our brief, with the 
development of the human embryo, carrying it through to the development of the fetus from 
about seven to nine days after conception.”  Justice Marshall: “Well, what about six days?”  
Floyd: “We don’t know.”  Justice Marshall: “But the statute goes all the way back to one 
hour?”  Floyd: “I don’t . . . Mr. Justice, there are unanswerable questions in this field.”  Id. at 
55:31. 
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The strongest part of Floyd’s argument comes in the waning minutes.  
He correctly summarized Appellant’s constitutional assertions as “the 
individual, or marital right of privacy . . . or the right to choose whether or 
not to abort a child.”90  He then made a strong point that 
neither individual nor marital privacy has been held to be absolute. 
We have legal search and seizure.  We have [criminalized] the 
possession of illegal drugs, the practice of polygamy, and other 
matters . . . .  As far as the freedom over one’s body is concerned, 
this is not absolute, the use of illicit drugs, the indecent exposure 
legislation[.]91 
Close listening suggests that Floyd read the case law, but that he was 
prone to making bone-headed remarks that strained his credibility.  In 
responding to questions from the bench, Floyd said in one instance, “I say, I 
have no authority to support this position, but it would appear . . . .”92 and a 
minute later, “Let me answer your question with a statement, if I may.”93  
When questioned about the purposes behind the Texas abortion statute, 
Floyd was only able to speculate.  He said, “This is just from my—I speak 
personally, [inaudible] I would think that even when this statute was first 
passed, there was some concern for the unborn fetus.”94  Justice Harry A. 
Blackmun pointed out, “Apart from your personal attitude, your court has 
spoken on the intent of the statute, has it not?”95  Floyd replied, “Yes,” but 
did not say more; he was unable to utilize legal precedent to establish his 
point.96  When asked how to reconcile seemingly inconsistent Texas court 
opinions on whose interests are at stake, Floyd’s response not only sounded 
ill-informed, but also undermined his own position: “Well, as I say, Your 
Honor, I don’t think the courts have come to the conclusion that the unborn 
has full juristic rights.  Not yet.  Maybe they will.  I don’t know.  I just don’t 
feel like they have, at the present time.”97 This, of course, is precisely what 
Floyd was asking the U.S. Supreme Court to determine, that a fetus is a 
person and has constitutional rights. 
Overall, Floyd comes across as rather bumbling, inconsistent, and light 
on the existing law and how it applied to this case, despite having brought a 
detailed outline of what he planned to cover during oral argument.98  
Although technically the Appellee—Roe had appealed the one claim denied 
 
 90  Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 57:37. 
 91  Id. at 58:20. 
 92  Id. at 40:40. 
 93  Id. at 41:38. 
 94  Id. at 54:13. 
 95  Id. at 54:49. 
 96  Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 54:55. 
 97  Id. at 55:09. 
 98  GARROW, supra note 33 at 526. 
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by the District Court—the state of Texas had also appealed the ruling.99  
Floyd should have been arguing zealously that the District Court erred in 
finding the Texas statute unconstitutional.  He should have argued that the 
District Court was incorrect, both because the Texas abortion statute was not 
vague and because there was no constitutional right to abortion.  Instead, 
Floyd spent the first half of his time at the podium arguing that Appellants 
lacked standing, and a significant portion in the middle of his time discussing 
(inaccurately) which party appealed where.100 
3. Rebuttal 
Oral argument best-practices suggest that the best use of rebuttal time 
is to “respond to the appellee’s presentation, not to rehash your argument in 
chief.”101  Then-lawyer, now Chief Justice, John Roberts has been quoted as 
advising, “Only go for home runs” during rebuttal.102 
During her brief rebuttal in the first Roe oral argument, Weddington did 
respond to Floyd’s presentation, but it was not exactly a home run: she 
pointed out that, contrary to Floyd’s assertion minutes before, Appellee had 
filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.103  The point was hardly one that 
pinned Floyd to the mat, but it was an attempt to demonstrate further that 
Floyd was not in control of the argument he was making to the Court.  Given 
Floyd’s hapless performance, Weddington’s point on rebuttal was probably 
redundant. 
C. The Second Oral Arguments: October 11, 1972 
A few months after the December 1971 oral arguments, the Court 
ordered reargument, despite the fact that a five-person majority seemed 
already secured.104  Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger pushed for 
the reargument, while Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall opposed the 
idea.105 
Various rationales have been offered for the Court’s order for 
reargument, including that the case was clearly an important one and that the 
advocates had been unhelpful during the first argument.106  In addition, there 
had only been seven Justices on the Court during the first argument and two 
 
 99  Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 1:02:38. 
 100  Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 45:12–47:39; see also infra text accompanying 
note 103. 
 101  ALDISERT, supra note 36, at 378. 
 102  FREDERICK, supra note 36, at 125. 
 103  Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 1:02:37. 
 104  EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 6, at 185–86; GARROW, supra note 33, at 553. 
 105  Joseph F. Kobylka, Tales from the Blackmun Papers: A Fuller Appreciation of Harry 
Blackmun’s Judicial Legacy, 70 MO. L. REV. 1075, 1087 (2005). 
 106  EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 6, at 185–86. 
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more had since been seated.107 
The more provocative possibility—though purely rumor—is that 
President Nixon requested that the Supreme Court delay its decision in Roe 
v. Wade until after Nixon’s 1972 reelection campaign.108  President Nixon 
had appointed Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun to the Court fairly 
early in his presidency, and it was these two Justices who pushed for 
reargument.  After the first oral arguments, Nixon would go on to appoint 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., but they were not yet on 
the Court when the decision was made to order reargument in Roe.109 
Whatever the rationale, the Court ordered reargument and also 
requested briefing on the issue of whether the right to abortion changes as 
pregnancy progresses.110  Appellants did not address this question in their 
supplemental brief and Appellee did not file a supplemental brief.111 
1. For Appellants Roe, et al.: Sarah Weddington 
During the second oral argument on October 11, 1972, Sarah 
Weddington again argued for Appellants, bringing up constitutional grounds 
for the right to an abortion six minutes into her argument.112  Relying on the 
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, along with “a great body of 
precedent[,]”113 she then referenced a variety of Supreme Court cases related 
to the right to privacy: 
The Court has in the past, for example, held that it is the right of 
the parents and of the individual to determine whether or not they 
will send their child to private school, whether or not their children 
will be taught foreign languages, whether or not they will have 
offspring—the Skinner case—whether the right to determine for 
themselves whom they will marry—the Loving case—and even in 
Boddie versus Connecticut, the choice saying that marriage itself 
is so important that the state cannot interfere with termination of 
a marriage just because the woman is unable to pay the cost.  
 
 107  GARROW, supra note 33, at 553, 537–38.  Justices John M. Harlan II and Hugo L. 
Black left the Court in September 1971, a few months before the first oral argument in Roe.  
See Justices, OYEZ, www.oyez.org/justices (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
 108  Telephone Interview with Sarah Weddington, Professor of History, University of 
Texas (retired) (Feb. 18, 2018).  In a memo among the Justices, Justice Douglas—who 
opposed reargument—wrote, “If the vote of the Conference is to reargue, then I will file a 
statement telling what is happening to us and the tragedy it entails.”  GARROW, supra note 33, 
at 553–54.  We do not know precisely what he was referring to, however.  Justice Douglas 
considered writing a dissent to the order for reargument, but ultimately did not.  Id. at 555–
56. 
 109  GARROW, supra note 33, at 553, 537–38. 
 110  JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 23. 
 111  EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 6, at 189. 
 112  Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 06:34. 
 113  Id. at 06:41. 
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Griswold, of course, is the primary case, holding that the state 
could not interfere in the question of whether or not a married 
couple would use birth control and, since then, the courts—this 
Court, of course, has held that the individual has the right to 
determine, whether they are married or single, whether they would 
use birth control.  So, there is a great body of cases decided in the 
past by this Court in the areas of marriage, sex, contraception, 
procreation, childbearing, and education of children which says 
that there are certain things that are so much part of the individual 
concern that they should be left to the determination of the 
individual.114 
Weddington spoke virtually uninterrupted for thirteen full minutes.115  
Looking back on the two sets of oral arguments, Weddington says the 
Justices were far less engaged the second time; it was as if their minds were 
already made up.116 
As the Justices attempted to raise hypotheticals, Weddington 
consistently refused to engage, repeatedly asking them only to rule on the 
statute before them.  Appellate argument frequently revolves around 
hypothetical questions from the bench, and the standard advice for oral 
advocates is to answer them: “Willingly answer hypotheticals.  Appellate 
courts are concerned not only with the outcome of your case but also with 
how their ruling will affect the law generally.”117  During the second oral 
argument, Weddington was much firmer in asking for the relief she requested 
than during her first oral argument, but her commitment to the relief 
requested translated into a near-refusal to answer the Justices’ hypotheticals.  
For example: 
Justice Burger: Do you make any distinction between the first 
month and the ninth month of gestation? 
Weddington: Our statute does not. 
Justice Burger: Do you, in your position in this case? 
Weddington: We are asking in this case that the Court declare the 
statute unconstitutional, the [S]tate having proved no compelling 
interest at all.118 
Weddington did not abandon the strong public policy arguments she 
relied upon during the first oral argument.  She referred to pregnancy as “an 
 
 114  Id. at 07:08. 
 115  The first substantive question came from Justice Stewart after approximately thirteen 
and a half minutes.  Id. at 13:33. 
 116  Telephone Interview with Sarah Weddington, Professor of History, University of 
Texas (retired) (Feb. 18, 2018). 
 117  GARNER, supra note 36, at 167; see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 36, at 155, 
194–95. 
 118  Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 16:49. 
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irreparable injury” and continued on in that vein for some time.119  Though 
criticized by some as failing to assert constitutional bases for the right to 
abortion, this theme of pregnancy-as-injury addressed the standing issues 
that Appellee hammered so hard during the first oral argument. 
During the second set of oral arguments, the Justices again elicited 
important—and matching—concessions from the advocates.  Justice Stewart 
asked Weddington, “If it were established that an unborn fetus is a person 
within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, you would have an 
almost impossible case here, would you not?”120  She replied, with some 
laughter in her voice, “I would have a very difficult case.”121  This 
concession, however, was one that ultimately was not used against the 
advocate’s position in the final opinion. 
2. For Appellee Wade: Robert Flowers 
Jay Floyd did not return to the Supreme Court for the second oral 
arguments on October 11, 1972.  Instead, his immediate supervisor in the 
Attorney General’s office, Robert Flowers, argued for Appellee.122  The 
thesis of his argument, indeed nearly the entire content of the thirty minutes 
he spent at the podium, was that a fetus is a person, leaving largely unsaid 
the legal consequence that fetal personhood means a woman has no right to 
an abortion.123  He attempted to impress upon the Justices that pregnancy, 
and thus personhood, is a medical truth: “[T]he Court must take . . . the 
medical research and apply it to our Constitution as best it can.”124 
Yet when specifically asked, Flowers admitted he had no medical 
evidence to support his thesis of fetal personhood: 
Justice Marshall: I want you to give me a . . . recognizable medical 
writing of any kind that says that at the time of conception that the 
fetus is a person. 
Flowers: I do not believe that I could give that to you without 
researching through the briefs that have been filed in this case, 
Your Honor.  I’m not sure that I can give it to you after research.125 
 
 119  Id. at 09:48. 
 120  Id. at 24:03. 
 121  Id. at 24:13. 
 122  GARROW, supra note 33, at 569.  
 123  Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 26:45. 
 124  Id. at 43:56.  It is an old joke, but if lawyers could do math, they would have become 
doctors. 
 125  Id. at 45:46.  Justice Rehnquist attempted to assist Flowers in finding medical 
authority, asking, “Did Judge Campbell rely on medical authorities in that statement you’re 
summarizing?”  Flowers replied, “Yes, sir, he did.”  Id. at 46:14.  Flowers, however, was still 
unable to provide Justice Marshall with citations to relevant medical authorities.  Flowers: 
“Now, I know he doesn’t address himself, Your Honor, to the moment of conception.”  Justice 
Marshall: “I didn’t think so.”  Id. at 48:51. 
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In fact, Flowers’s medical evidence explained the progression of fetal 
development, but did not articulate when life began.126  Moreover, when 
pressed, Flowers backed away from his emphasis on medical certainty: 
Justice Stewart: You think it’s basically a medical question? 
Flowers: From a constitutional standpoint, no, sir.127 
Justice Blackmun: Is it not true, or is it true, that the medical 
profession itself is not in agreement as to when life begins? 
Flowers: I think that’s true, sir.  But from a layman’s standpoint, 
medically speaking, we would say that at the moment of 
conception, from the chromosomes, every potential that anybody 
in this room has is present from the moment of conception.128 
Unable to make a cohesive medical argument for personhood, Flowers 
conceded early in the argument that he was unaware of any cases that hold a 
fetus is a person.129  Yet ten minutes later, he articulated several cases where 
courts had identified tort rights of fetuses.130  His inability to make the 
connection in a more timely manner weakened his position and his 
credibility—he appeared unable to draw connections between his assertions 
and, by extension, unable to understand their implications. 
Flowers argued consistently that life (by which he meant personhood) 
begins at conception, yet he was unable to offer any medical or legal 
evidence to support his argument.  Lacking evidentiary support, Flowers 
turned to the emotional: 
This Court has been diligent in protecting the rights of the 
minorities, and gentlemen, we say that this is a minority, a silent 
minority, the true silent minority. Who is speaking for these 
children?  Where is the counsel for these unborn children, whose 
life is being taken?  Where is the safeguard of the right to trial by 
jury?  Are we to place this power in the hands of a mother?  In a 
doctor?131  I think that, possibly, we have an opportunity to make 
one of the worst mistakes here that we’ve ever made.132 
As the other advocates did before him, Flowers made a key concession: 
Justice White: You’ve lost your case, then, if the fetus or the 
embryo is not a person, is that it? 
 
 126  E.g., id. at 44:43. 
 127  Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 27:57. 
 128  Id. at 30:52. 
 129  Id. at 28:15. 
 130  Id. at 38:38 (citing Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967), abrogated by 
Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem’l Hosp. v. 
Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J. 1964); Jones v. Jones, 144 N.Y.S.2d 820 (Sup. Ct. 1955)). 
 131  Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 41:52.  Flowers consistently referred to fetuses as 
“children” and pregnant women as “mothers.”  See discussion infra Part IV.A.2. 
 132  Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 44:12. 
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Flowers: Yes sir, I would say so.133 
During the oral argument, Flowers appears to have been quite 
unprepared.  He answered numerous questions from the bench with 
responses such as, “I would think so,”134 and “I would assume so.”135  
Flowers ran out of material several minutes early, thanking the Justices in a 
farewell tone of voice before they peppered him with a few more 
questions.136  The comments leading up to Flowers’s thanks, which were 
presumably his closing remarks, are so vague as to be almost nonsensical: 
In this whole field of abortion here we have, on the one hand, a 
great clamoring for this liberization [sic] of it.  Perhaps this is 
good.  Population explosion, we have so many things that are 
arriving on the scene in the past few years that might have some 
effect on producing this type of legislature [sic], rather than facing 
the facts squarely.  I don’t think anyone has faced the fact in 
making a decision whether this is a life, in a person concept.137 
Flowers admitted later that he was unprepared, and that he had not even made 
notes about what he wanted to cover during the argument.138 
3. Rebuttal 
After Flowers’s haphazard performance, Weddington retook the 
podium139 and hit a few home runs.  Using Flowers’s admissions against him, 
Weddington asserted that if there was no proof of when life begins or that 
the statute was designed to protect fetal life, then the decision to continue a 
pregnancy must be a decision that “is so fundamentally a part of individual 
life of the family, of such fundamental impact on the person[.]”140 
Justice White, stammering a bit, said, “[Y]our argument, as the way 
you state it, is that it wouldn’t make any difference what part of pregnancy 
the [S]tate would [prevent] the abortion—[i]t will still be 
unconstitutional.”141  Weddington replied calmly, “At this time, there is no 
indication to show that the Constitution would give any protection [to a fetus] 
prior to birth,”142 and that the Texas abortion statute “certainly is void 
 
 133  Id. at 36:38.  Flowers responded so quickly and readily it seems likely he did not 
understand what he was being asked.  Id. 
 134  E.g., id. at 33:56. 
 135  Id. at 38:13. 
 136  Id. at 52:15. 
 137  Id. at 51:25. 
 138  GARROW, supra note 33, at 569. 
 139  Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 55:28. 
 140  Id. at 55:43.  Weddington was interrupted before she finished her sentence, but her 
point was made.  Id. 
 141  Id. at 56:22. 
 142  Id. at 56:36. 
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because it infringes upon the fundamental right at a time when the [S]tate 
can show no compelling interest early in pregnancy.”143  Weddington also 
addressed several of Flowers’s contentions concisely: 
No one is more keenly aware of the gravity of the issues or the 
moral implications of this case, but it is a case that must be decided 
on the Constitution. We do not disagree that there is a progression 
of fetal development. It is the conclusion to be drawn from that, 
upon which we disagree. We are not here to advocate abortion. 
We do not ask this Court to rule that abortion is good or desirable 
in any particular situation. We are here to advocate that the 
decision as to whether or not a particular woman will continue to 
carry or will terminate a pregnancy is a decision that should be 
made by that individual.144 
All in all, the second set of oral arguments somewhat refined the 
possible grounds on which a woman’s right to an abortion might or might 
not be protected by the Constitution, but it did not provide new arguments or 
evidence from the State that fetuses have constitutional rights, nor did it flesh 
out the State’s interests in regulating abortions. 
After both sets of oral arguments, Weddington wrote, “I think we are 
going to win this case. Not sure what grounds or how good the opinion will 
be, but [I] really think we’ll win.”145  Her uncertainty about what the grounds 
would be was warranted, since she had presented the Court with a wide 
variety of possible Constitutional arguments without advocating for one in 
particular. 
III. TRACING THE OPINION 
Sarah Weddington’s prediction,146 that Appellants would win the case, 
proved (mostly) true: the Supreme Court struck down the Texas abortion 
statute as unconstitutional and largely affirmed the District Court’s 
rulings.147  She was also right to be cautious about what the grounds would 
be, because the majority opinion announced rules no one had anticipated. 
Justice Blackmun wrote for a seven-person majority.  The text of the 
majority opinion is fifty-one pages long in the United States Reports.148  
Following a brief introduction, the majority opinion proceeded in twelve 
parts. 
 
 143  Id. at 58:07. 
 144  Id. at 01:01:21. 
 145  See GARROW, supra note 33, at 573. 
 146  Id. 
 147  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166–67 (1973).  The Supreme Court reversed the District 
Court’s determination that Hallford had standing.  Id. 
 148  Excluding the Court’s syllabus and recitation of the attorneys. 
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In the introductory paragraphs, the opinion acknowledged the swirling 
storm that the abortion debate engenders in the United States, and identified 
“the sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion controversy . . . the 
vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, and . . . the deep and 
seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires.”149 
The introduction also noted that “population growth, pollution, poverty, 
and racial overtones tend to complicate and not to simplify the problem.”150  
These points had not been addressed in any of the briefs, but were addressed 
at oral argument.  Weddington had stressed the impact of the law on “the 
poor and the disadvantaged in Texas” during the first oral argument,151 and 
Flowers referred to “population explosion” during the second oral 
argument.152  No brief or oral argument, however, mentioned a disparate 
impact of the abortion laws on women of different races, and the opinion did 
not go on to analyze the “racial overtones” it casually mentioned. 
Part I recited the Texas statutes at issue, noting that the statutes have 
been “substantially unchanged” since the 1850s and that “[s]imilar statutes 
are in existence in a majority of the States.”153  Part II reviewed the identities 
of Appellants Jane Roe, John and Mary Doe, and James Hallford, as well as 
recited the procedural posture of the case.154  Part III consists of a single 
paragraph, which explains that the Court will hear both the declaratory and 
injunctive aspects of the case.155 
In Part IV, the Court addressed the standing of the four Appellants.156  
Given that this subject took up such a significant part of the oral 
arguments,157 the Court disposed of this issue rather quickly, in just a couple 
of pages apiece.  Roe was found to have standing, given that “there can be 
little dispute that [her case] then presented a case or controversy and that, 
wholly apart from the class aspects, she, as a pregnant single woman 
thwarted by the Texas criminal abortion laws, had standing to challenge 
those statutes.”158  These points were made in Appellants’ brief159 as well as 
at oral argument, though in both instances Appellants emphasized the class 
 
 149  Roe, 410 U.S. at 116. 
 150  Id. 
 151  Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 06:07. 
 152  Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 51:43. 
 153  Roe, 410 U.S. at 118. 
 154  Id. at 120–22. 
 155  Id. at 123. 
 156  Id. at 123–29. 
 157  See supra text accompanying notes 40–43, 64, 80–82, 89, 100. 
 158  Roe, 410 U.S. at 124.  The Court acknowledged that were it to hold otherwise, 
pregnancy-related claims “truly could be ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’”  Id. at 
125 (citations omitted). 
 159  Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at 54. 
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action nature of Roe’s case more than the Court did in finding standing.160  
The majority went on to find that neither Dr. Hallford nor the Does had 
standing: Dr. Hallford did not have standing because his relief regarding 
pending or possible criminal prosecution must be in state courts,161 and the 
Does did not have standing because the Court was “not prepared to say that 
the bare allegation of so indirect an injury [wa]s sufficient to present an 
actual case or controversy.”162  Here, the Court adopted the points made by 
Appellee in its brief and at oral argument.163 
Part V of the majority opinion is a single paragraph, which served as a 
kind of transition into the next section.  Part V summarized Roe’s argument: 
that [the Texas statutes] improperly invade a right, said to be 
possessed by the pregnant woman, to choose to terminate her 
pregnancy.  Appellant would discover this right in the concept of 
personal ‘liberty’ embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause; or in personal, marital, familial, and sexual 
privacy said to be protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras; 
or among those rights reserved to the people by the Ninth 
Amendment.164 
This is a concise recitation of the points Weddington raised at oral argument 
and in her brief in support of a woman’s right to terminate an unwanted 
pregnancy.165  Appellants asserted, in their brief and at oral arguments, that 
the Texas statutes were unconstitutionally vague, but the majority did not 
reach that argument.166 
Part VI is the longest section of the opinion, at just over seventeen 
pages, in which the Court reviewed the history of laws and attitudes about 
 
 160  Compare Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at 54, and Oral Argument I, supra note 
37, at 10:34 (emphasizing the class action), with Roe, 410 U.S. at 124–25 (no reliance on the 
class to find standing).  The Court did not analyze whether Roe could have had standing to 
challenge a criminal statute to which she could not have been subject; the Texas abortion 
statute criminalized the behavior of doctors performing abortions, not women receiving them. 
 161  Roe, 410 U.S. at 126. 
 162  Id. at 128 (citations omitted). 
 163  Brief for Appellee, supra note 32, at 12; Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 34:27 
(Does’s standing), 42:38 (Hallford’s standing). 
 164  Roe, 410 U.S. at 129 (citations omitted). 
 165  Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at 91–124; Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 
17:33. 
 166  Compare Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at 125, and Oral Argument I, supra note 
37, at 05:20 (arguing that the statutes are unconstitutionally vague), with Roe, 410 U.S. at 164 
(declining to consider the vagueness argument).  Appellants’ brief also contained an argument 
that the Texas abortion statutes violated a doctor’s right to presumed innocence and the 
privilege against self-incrimination by placing the burden of proving the medical necessity of 
the abortion on the doctor.  Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at 140.  This argument was 
not mentioned at the oral arguments and it does not appear in any of the final opinions in the 
case. 
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abortion.167  Taking a very long historical view, the majority described the 
hundred-plus years of American abortion restriction laws to be “of relatively 
recent vintage.”168  The majority reviewed abortion practices and attitudes in 
the Persian, Roman, and Greek Empires, as well as the history of the 
Hippocratic Oath, which dates from about 400 B.C., and in some translations 
contains language that the doctor will not perform or assist in the 
procurement of abortions.169 
Part VI continued by analyzing how English and American common 
law placed restrictions on abortions performed after “quickening,” but not 
before.170  This may be one of the Court’s inspirations for ultimately 
concluding that the state’s interest in protecting fetal life matures at viability, 
though the majority opinion uses “viability” rather than “quickening” as the 
relevant point in time.171  Later English statutory laws generally preserved 
the distinction between abortions performed before and after quickening, 
though these laws also introduced the exception that abortions after 
quickening were permissible to save the life of the mother.172  American 
statutes, comparatively, which were first passed in the decades following the 
Civil War, retained the exception for abortions performed to save the 
woman’s life, but “the quickening distinction disappeared[.]”173 
The briefs contain comparatively little on the history of abortion.  
Appellants’ brief spent only a few paragraphs on the history of anti-abortion 
statutes in the 1800s, but in less detail than the majority opinion.174  Neither 
the Appellee’s brief nor the Appellants’ supplemental brief addressed the 
history of abortion.175  Justice Blackmun, the author of the majority, had 
signaled his interest in this historical perspective several times during the 
second oral argument.  For example, he questioned Flowers: “When you 
quote Blackstone, is it not true that in Blackstone’s time abortion was not a 
felony?”176  And later: 
 
 
 167  Roe, 410 U.S. at 129–47. 
 168  Id. at 129. 
 169  Id. at 130–31. 
 170  Id. at 132–36 (English common law), 138–39 (American common law). 
 171  Id. at 163–64 (announcing the trimester framework).  Justice Blackmun admitted in a 
conference memo that the end of the first trimester timeframe is “arbitrary, but perhaps any 
other selected point, such as quickening or viability, is equally arbitrary[.]”  JOHNSON, supra 
note 2, at 71. 
 172  Roe, 410 U.S. at 136–38. 
 173  Id. at 139.  The majority opinion also reviewed the positions of the American Medical 
Association, the American Public Health Association, and the American Bar Association on 
abortion procedures.  Id. at 143–47 n.40. 
 174  Compare Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at 34–35, with Roe, 410 U.S. at 138–39. 
 175  See Oral Argument I, supra note 37; Oral Argument II, supra note 34. 
 176  Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 30:24. 
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Justice Blackmun: Do you know as a matter of historical fact when 
most of these abortion statutes came on the books? 
Flowers: I think it was—most of them were in the mid-1800s, 
Your Honor. 
Justice Blackmun: In fact, the latter half of the 19th century.  Do 
you know why they all came on them at that time? 
Flowers: No, sir, I surely don’t. I’m sorry.177 
During the second oral argument, Justice Blackmun also questioned 
Weddington about the Hippocratic Oath, asking why it had not been 
discussed in her brief.178  Weddington explained—appropriately—that the 
content of the Hippocratic Oath did not define constitutional rights in the 
United States, but Justice Blackmun persisted, both at oral argument179 and 
by including the Hippocratic Oath in the opinion.180  His interest in the 
Hippocratic Oath may reflect his personal attachment to the medical field; 
he served as counsel to the Mayo Clinic during this period.181 
Part VII analyzed Texas’s asserted reasons behind the criminal abortion 
statute.  At oral arguments, the advocates struggled to articulate the 
legislative rationales.  During the first oral argument, Floyd offered both the 
interest in protecting fetal life182 and in protecting the health of the woman,183 
but he was not authoritative on either point: “This is just from my—I speak 
personally, if I may, I would think that even when this statute was first 
passed, there was some concern for the unborn fetus.”184  Weddington 
asserted that there was no legislative history regarding the Texas law and 
that “the only legislative history . . . is that which is found in other states . . . 
that these statutes were adopted for the health of the mother.”185  Weddington 
had criticized the State’s inability to “point to any authority, of any nature 
whatsoever, that would demonstrate that this statute was, in fact, adopted for 
[the] purpose [of protecting the life of the fetus].”186 
The Court nevertheless identified state interests behind the abortion 
statutes, critiquing each in turn.  First, the Court acknowledged the State’s 
rationale “to discourage illicit sexual conduct,” but dismissed this out of 
hand, writing that “it appears that no court or commentator has taken th[is] 
 
 177  Id. at 53:43. 
 178  Id. at 19:46. 
 179  Id. at 59:43. 
 180  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130–31 (1973).  
 181  Telephone Interview with Sarah Weddington, Professor of History, University of 
Texas (retired) (Feb. 18, 2018); see also infra Part IV.A.3. 
 182  Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 48:20. 
 183  Id. at 53:34. 
 184  Id. at 54:13. 
 185  Id. at 20:53. 
 186  Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 12:37. 
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argument seriously.”187  Second, the Court acknowledged the State’s 
“concern[] with abortion as a medical procedure[,]” but finds that 
“[m]ortality rates for women undergoing early abortions, where the 
procedure is legal, appear to be as low as or lower than the rates for normal 
childbirth.”188  The safety of the abortion procedure was emphasized by 
Appellants in both briefs and at both oral arguments.189  Third, the Court 
analyzed “the State’s interest—some phrase it in terms of duty—in 
protecting prenatal life.”190  Appellee stressed the importance of protecting 
fetal life in the brief and at both oral arguments.191  The Court, however, 
pointed out that legislative history does not support this view and notes that 
“the pregnant woman herself could not be prosecuted for self-abortion or for 
cooperating in an abortion performed upon her by another.”192  Weddington 
had hammered that last point at both oral arguments: if the abortion statute 
was designed to protect fetal life, it made no sense that a pregnant woman 
who received an abortion (or even performed one on herself) was not 
liable.193 
Part VIII is the beginning of the “meat and potatoes” of the Roe 
majority opinion.  Here, the Court acknowledged a constitutionally protected 
right to privacy, and concluded that the right “is broad enough to encompass 
a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”194  
Strangely, the Court did not announce where in the Constitution the right to 
privacy is founded, writing instead that the Court “fe[lt]” the right was 
located “in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty” but 
acknowledged—without exactly disagreeing—that the District Court found 
the right to be located in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the 
people.195  Here, the Court acknowledged “[t]he detriment that the State 
would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying her this choice 
altogether”:196 
Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early 
pregnancy may be involved.  Maternity, or additional offspring, 
 
 187  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 148 (1973). 
 188  Id. at 148–49. 
 189  Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 10, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-
18), 1972 WL 126044, at *10 [hereinafter Supplemental Brief for Appellants]; Brief for 
Appellants, supra note 16, at 23, 30; Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 12:41; Oral Argument 
II, supra note 34, at 05:03. 
 190  Roe, 410 U.S. at 150. 
 191  Brief for Appellee, supra note 32, at 56; Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 48:20; 
Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 37:02. 
 192  Roe, 410 U.S. at 150–51. 
 193  Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 07:48; Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 10:21. 
 194  Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
 195  Id. 
 196  Id. 
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may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. 
Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health 
may be taxed by child care.  There is also the distress, for all 
concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the 
problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, 
psychologically or otherwise, to care for it.  In other cases, as in 
this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of 
unwed motherhood may be involved.197 
At oral argument, of course, Weddington stressed the impact unwanted 
pregnancy has on the life of a woman.198 
As is now well known, the Court announced in Part VIII of the opinion 
that “[t]he privacy right involved . . . cannot be said to be absolute” and that 
a court must consider the important state interests in regulating abortion.199  
The Court found that a majority of state and federal abortion decisions over 
the past two or three years reached this same conclusion.200  At the second 
oral argument, Weddington had itemized the number of cases in lower courts 
that held in favor of the woman.201  Yet the Appellee asserted in his brief202 
and at the first oral argument that other constitutional rights are not 
unlimited: “We have legal search and seizure.  We have [criminalized] the 
possession of illegal drugs, the practice of polygamy, and other matters.”203  
The Court obviously agreed with both positions. 
In Part IX, the Court addressed whether fetuses themselves have 
constitutional protections, as distinct from whether states have interests in 
protecting fetal life.204  Fetal personhood was a large focus of Appellee’s first 
oral argument and the near-total content of the second oral argument.205  
Unfortunately for these advocates, the Court concluded exactly the opposite 
of the proffered arguments, which may have resulted largely from the 
advocates’ failure to provide legal or medical evidence supporting the 
assertion of fetal personhood.206 
Analyzing the language of the Constitution, the Court concluded that a 
fetus is not a “person” under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that 
constitutional protections do not attach until birth.207  The Court noted: 
 
 197  Id. 
 198  See supra text accompanying notes 43–47, 119. 
 199  Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. 
 200  Id. at 154–55. 
 201  Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 01:00:56. 
 202  Brief for Appellee, supra note 32, at 8–9. 
 203  Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 58:27. 
 204  Roe, 410 U.S. at 156–62. 
 205  See supra Parts II.B.2, II.C.2.  
 206  See supra text accompanying notes 88, 123–33. 
 207  Roe, 410 U.S. at 156–59. 
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If this suggestion of personhood [before birth] is established, the 
[A]ppellant’s case, of course, collapses, for the fetus’ right to life 
would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment. . . .  On 
the other hand, the [A]ppellee conceded on reargument that no 
case could be cited that holds that a fetus is a person within the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.208 
Floyd made the same concession during the first oral argument: “I don’t 
think the courts have come to the conclusion that the unborn has full juristic 
rights. . . .  I just don’t feel like they have, at the present time.”209 
During both oral arguments, the Justices pressed Appellee’s advocates 
to articulate and defend their assertions about when life begins.210  Though 
both asserted that life began at conception, their positions fell apart upon 
closer questioning.211  In the final majority opinion, the Court abandoned 
efforts to determine when life begins, writing: “When those trained in the 
respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to 
arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of 
man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.”212  The 
Court reviewed the conflicting historical, legal, religious, and medical views 
about when life begins, finally noting that “[i]n areas other than criminal 
abortion, the law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we 
recognize it, begins before live birth or to accord legal rights to the unborn 
except in narrowly defined situations and except when the rights are 
contingent upon live birth.”213  Weddington discussed this with the Justices 
in her second oral argument, and the majority opinion contains—and 
expands upon—the information she provided regarding tort injuries 
available to babies who sustained injuries as fetuses as well as the inheritance 
rights of the unborn.214 
Part X of the majority opinion reiterated the woman’s right to choose 
to terminate a pregnancy and the two “important and legitimate” state 
interests of “preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman . . . 
and . . . protecting the potentiality of human life.”215  The Court then 
introduced the trimester framework for which Roe is remembered: (1) the 
state may not infringe on the woman’s right to choose to terminate a 
pregnancy during the first trimester; (2) the state’s interest in protecting the 
woman’s health permits regulation of the procedure after the end of the first 
 
 208  Id. at 156–57; see also Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 28:15. 
 209  Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 55:10. 
 210  See supra text accompanying notes 97, 123–33. 
 211  See supra text accompanying notes 97, 123–33. 
 212  Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. 
 213  Id. at 161. 
 214  Id. at 161–62; Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 25:18. 
 215  Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. 
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trimester; and (3) after viability, the state’s interest in the potential life 
becomes “compelling” enough that the state “may go so far as to proscribe 
abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life 
or health of the mother.”216  Here, Weddington’s concession during the first 
oral argument comes back to haunt her: “Obviously I have a much more 
difficult time saying that the state has no interest in late pregnancy.”217  
Though she quickly tried to characterize this interest as an “emotional 
response to a late pregnancy”218 rather than as a constitutional interest, the 
damage to her case was done. 
“Measured against these [newly-announced] standards,” the Court 
concluded, the Texas abortion law “sweeps too broadly” and is 
unconstitutional.219  Based on this reasoning, the Court also declines to 
address Roe’s argument that the statute is unconstitutionally vague.220 
Part XII concludes the opinion.221  Here, the Court strikes down the 
entirety of the Texas abortion statutes, and writes, “we assume the Texas 
prosecutorial authorities will give full credence to this decision[.]”222  
Procedurally, Dr. Hallford’s complaint is dismissed as an intervenor, but the 
remainder of the District Court’s judgments are affirmed.223 
Overall, the major surprise of the Roe majority opinion was the 
announcement of the trimester framework, which neither party had briefed 
nor argued.  Over the course of both oral arguments, several Justices asked 
questions about whether a state’s interest in protecting fetal life changed as 
the pregnancy progressed.  Justice White asked Weddington whether the 
Texas statute “ma[d]e distinctions based upon what period of pregnancy the 
abortion is performed[,]”224 and Chief Justice Burger asked Weddington 
whether Texas could “constitutionally, in [her] view, declare by statute that 
a fetus is a person for all constitutional purposes after the third month of 
gestation?”225  There were no questions, however, that got as specific as the 
ultimately-announced trimester framework. 
All in all, comparing the oral arguments to the final majority opinion, 
it is clear that strongly-argued points were influential, such as the impact of 
 
 216  Id. at 163–64. 
 217  Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 23:34. 
 218  Id. at 23:42. 
 219  Roe, 410 U.S. at 164. 
 220  Id. 
 221  Part XI of the opinion is a summary of the foregoing that does not contain any new 
substantive material. 
 222  Roe, 410 U.S. at 166. 
 223  Id. at 166–67. 
 224  Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 22:28. 
 225  Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 24:38. 
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unwanted pregnancy on women’s lives,226 and the truism that constitutional 
rights are not unlimited.227  It is also evident that weakly-argued points were 
largely unpersuasive to the Justices, such as unsupported assertions that 
fetuses have constitutional rights.  The glaring exception, though, is that 
despite Weddington’s inability (or unwillingness) to commit to a 
constitutional theory that would support a woman’s right to abortion, the 
majority of Justices found that right to exist, even though they were also 
rather wishy-washy on where the right was found.228 
Another important takeaway when comparing the oral arguments to the 
majority opinion is that concessions matter.  Each advocate made a 
concession at oral argument that the Court raised against them in its opinion.  
Weddington conceded at the first oral argument that she had “a much more 
difficult time saying that the [S]tate has no interest in late pregnancy[,]”229 
and conceded during the second oral argument that she “would have a very 
difficult case” if the Court found that fetuses were people under the 
Constitution.230  The advocates for Texas conceded that they had no sources 
establishing fetal personhood, either legal231 or medical.232 
Overall, it appears that the advocates’ performances at oral argument 
did shape the majority opinion, in that the stronger advocacy found its way 
into the opinion. 
IV. ROE’S ORAL ARGUMENTS AND FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 
Feminist legal theory233 was only in its infancy when Roe v. Wade was 
argued and decided, and advocate Sarah Weddington admits she did not 
incorporate even the nascent feminist legal theory into her case.234  From a 
feminist standpoint, however, the case was both a product of its time and 
also shaped feminism and feminist legal theory going forward.  This section 
analyzes both oral arguments in Roe v. Wade through various lenses of 
feminist legal theory.235 
 
 226  See supra text accompanying notes 43–47, 119. 
 227  See supra text accompanying notes 91, 202–03. 
 228  See supra text accompanying note 195. 
 229  Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 23:34. 
 230  Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 24:13. 
 231  Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 55:10; Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 28:15. 
 232  See supra text accompanying notes 124–28. 
 233  “[F]eminist theory assumes that the oppression of women is part of the way the 
structure of the world is organized, and that one task of feminist theory is to explain how and 
why this structure evolved.”  Jane Flax, Women Do Theory, in FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS 81 
(Alison M.  Jaggar & Paula S. Rothenberg eds., 3d ed. 1993). 
 234  Telephone Interview with Sarah Weddington, Professor of History, University of 
Texas (retired) (Feb. 18, 2018). 
 235  “[T]heoretical writing is often so full of jargon that it seems divorced from ordinary 
experience.”  Flax, supra note 233, at 81.  This Article strives to avoid this problem. 
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“Feminist legal theory” is, of course, a rich and diverse body of 
scholarship, and it would be impossible to encapsulate all of it here.  A few 
primary schools of thought have emerged, however. This Article will briefly 
summarize these schools, though it will go beyond these classifications in its 
examination of the Roe oral arguments. 
Equal treatment theory and liberal feminism posit that the law should 
not treat women differently than similarly-situated men.236  Emphasizing the 
similarities between men and women, equal treatment theory has had 
primary implications in employment and economic settings.237 Equal 
treatment theory also asserts that “the law should not base decisions about 
individual women on generalizations (even statistically accurate ones) about 
women as a group.”238  Accentuating the similarities between women and 
men also means downplaying the differences, and liberal feminism has been 
portrayed as “de-emphasi[zing] the mothering role.”239  Relatedly, equal 
treatment theorists assert that pregnancy should be treated as any other 
disability.240  Treating pregnancy as a disability, however, as the Family 
Medical Leave Act does, means that only women will take such leave; this 
means that women who desire to have children are technically protected by 
the law, yet employers are still incentivized to hire men who will not be 
requesting pregnancy-related leave.241 
Cultural feminism emerged, in part, as a response to equal treatment 
theory, acknowledging and embracing the biological and cultural differences 
between women and men rather than focusing on similarities.242  Cultural 
feminism is based on educational psychologist Carol Gilligan’s work and 
book, In a Different Voice, which concluded “that women and men display 
different emotional and cognitive traits and social skills.  Women reason with 
an ethic of care, emphasizing connections and relations with other people, 
while men reason with an ethic of rights, stressing rules and autonomy 
concerns.”243  Cultural feminist legal theory seeks to explore “how women’s 
 
 236  ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS & HUMAN NATURE 28 (1983) (liberal 
feminism) (“The liberal conception of the good society . . . is one that . . . protect[s] the 
dignity of each individual and promote[s] individual autonomy and self-fulfillment.”); NANCY 
LEVIT & ROBERT R. M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: A PRIMER 12 (2006) (equal 
treatment theory). 
 237  LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 236, at 8. 
 238  Id. at 16. 
 239  MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 22 (3d ed. 2013). 
 240  LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 236, at 21. 
 241  Id. at 21–22. 
 242  LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 236, at 18. 
 243  Id. at 9, 19–20.  This takeaway—that women reason with an ethic of care and men 
reason with an ethic of rights—is a bit of an oversimplification of Gilligan’s thesis.  Gilligan’s 
book grew out of her observations that oftentimes women talked about their lives in language 
that did not fit the psychological models of the time.  Gilligan suggested this meant not that 
CHRISTOPHER (DO NOT DELETE) 12/17/2018  4:04 PM 
338 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:307 
‘different voice’—with its concern for human relationships and for the 
positive values of caring, nurturing, empathy, and connection—could find 
greater expression in law.”244 
By considering women’s “different voice,” cultural feminism also 
“br[ought] into focus the thoroughgoing but previously unacknowledged 
gender-structuring of human society and human nature.”245  This school of 
thought asserts that purely formal equality of opportunity does not lead 
directly to equality of results: that “identical treatment of each group might 
never produce meaningful equality.”246  For example, cultural feminists 
argue that pregnancy-specific disability policies are sensible and appropriate, 
because the condition burdens only women.247  Without gender-specific 
protections, women who “could not perform as men [in the workplace] [are] 
not entitled to equal treatment and need not be hired.”248 
Equal treatment theory, liberal feminism, and cultural feminism have 
been criticized for setting out the male experience as the norm, addressing 
the female experience only insofar as it is similar to or different from the 
male.249  Cultural feminism, with its emphasis on “empathy, nurturing, [and] 
caretaking” has also been criticized for “reinforc[ing] women’s stereotypical 
association with domesticity.”250 
Dominance theory, developed by Catharine MacKinnon in 1979, 
focuses on the difference in power between men and women.251  The theory 
identifies economic, political, and familial inequalities that arise from 
patterns of male domination.252  Dominance theory has been influential in 
 
women were flawed, but that the models were.  See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT 1–4 (1982).  Gilligan did not attempt 
to analyze the origins of the differences in language used by men and women, but noted that 
“[c]learly, these differences arise in a social context where factors of social status and power 
combine with reproductive biology to shape the experience of males and females and the 
relation between the sexes.”  Id. at 2. 
 244  CHAMALLAS, supra note 239, at 22. 
 245  JAGGAR, supra note 236, at 98. 
 246  CHAMALLAS, supra note 239, at 21. 
 247  Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1701 
(1990). 
 248  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal 
Education or “The Fem-Crits Go to Law School”, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61, 72 (1988). 
 249  See SHARON L. ROACH ANLEU, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 428 (2d ed. 2010) (“As male 
is the implicit reference for human, maleness will be the measure of equality in sex 
discrimination law.”); see also LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 236, at 9. 
 250  LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 236, at 20. 
 251  See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON 
LIFE AND LAW 32 (1988). 
 252  See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v. 
Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135 (2000). 
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reshaping legal approaches to rape, sexual harassment, and pornography,253 
but it is criticized for framing all women as victims and universalizing the 
female experience (especially the white, middle-class female experience.)254 
Postmodern feminist legal theory and critical race feminism are two 
newer schools of intersectional feminist legal theory, which stress the 
differences between women’s experiences, especially when looking across 
racial and socioeconomic lines.255  These theories reject the idea that women 
have universal experiences. 
Between and among these various schools of feminist legal theory 
emerge two theoretical axes.  First, are women best considered as being like 
men or different from them?  Second, are women better theorized as a group 
or as individuals?  This section asks where along these axes the Roe v. Wade 
oral arguments were framed, and whether that framing was ultimately 
harmful or beneficial.256 
A. Are Women Like Men, or Are They Different? 
A recurring theme in contemporary feminist thought focuses on 
“difference.”  On one side, feminists argue that to overcome 
oppression and inequality women must be treated equally or in the 
same way as men. In contrast, others maintain that women have 
distinctive and special qualities which should be recognized and 
 
 253  See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985). 
 254  E.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. 
REV. 581, 585 (1990).  Harris argues that MacKinnon’s work 
though powerful and brilliant in many ways, relies on . . . gender 
essentialism—the notion that a unitary, “essential” women’s experience 
can be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual 
orientation, and other realities of experience.  The result of this tendency 
toward gender essentialism . . . is not only that some voices are silenced 
in order to privilege others . . . but that the voices that are silenced turn 
out to be the same voices silenced by the mainstream legal voice of “We 
the People”—among them, the voices of black women. 
Id. 
 255  See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity 
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); see also 
CHAMALLAS, supra note 239, at 23–26.  Other schools of feminist thought also exist, but are 
omitted here as not being particularly useful in analyzing the Roe v. Wade oral arguments—
e.g., lesbian legal theory, pragmatic legal feminism, and ecofeminism.  See LEVIT & 
VERCHICK, supra note 236, at 29–31, 34–44 for more on those theories. 
 256  Future works should also analyze the Roe v. Wade oral arguments and the 
public/private dichotomy, such as Weddington’s assertion that, “a woman, because of her 
pregnancy, is often not a productive member of society.  She cannot work, she cannot hold a 
job, she’s not eligible for welfare, she cannot get unemployment compensation.  And 
furthermore, in fact, the pregnancy may produce a child who will become a ward of the state.”  
Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 01:00:10. 
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given greater credence.257 
1. Individual Right or Gender Discrimination? 
Roe v. Wade was briefed and argued as a due process case, not as an 
equal protection case, meaning that the Plaintiffs in Roe framed their case 
not as a gender discrimination case, but as an individual rights case.258  But 
why should this be so, when abortion is perhaps the most gendered legal 
issue the Court has decided? 
The most straightforward answer is that at the time Roe was being 
decided, gender discrimination was not unconstitutional.  Craig v. Boren, the 
case in which the Supreme Court announced that discrimination on the basis 
of gender would be subject to heightened scrutiny, was argued and decided 
in 1976,259 three years after the Roe decision and six years after the Roe 
Plaintiffs originally filed suit. 
So, while gender cases would later be analyzed under an equal 
protection framework, that argument was not available to Roe.  Weddington 
admitted at the first oral argument that the suit had originally been brought 
“alleging both [a violation of] the Due Process [C]lause, [the] Equal 
Protection [C]lause, the Ninth Amendment, and a variety of others[,]”260 but 
the equal protection argument had fallen away by the time the case was 
briefed for the Supreme Court—neither the briefs nor the oral arguments 
included an equal protection or explicit gender discrimination argument.  
This was probably a good strategic decision, as the Court of this era was not 
prepared to consider pregnancy to be a gendered issue.261 
Instead, the Plaintiffs’ case was argued under an individual rights 
analysis, relying on either the Ninth Amendment262 or the Fourteenth 
Amendment263 to support a woman’s right to terminate an unwanted 
 
 257  ANLEU, supra note 249, at 424.  
 258  See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to 
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 386 (1985) (“Overall, the Court’s Roe position is 
weakened, I believe, by the opinion’s concentration on a medically approved autonomy idea, 
to the exclusion of a constitutionally based sex-equality perspective.”). 
 259  Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 260  Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 19:16. 
 261  See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that the exclusion of 
pregnancy from disability insurance does not violate the Equal Protection Clause).  “The lack 
of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such under this insurance program 
becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis.  The program divides potential recipients into 
two groups—pregnant women and nonpregnant persons.  While the first group is exclusively 
female, the second includes members of both sexes.  The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the 
program thus accrue to members of both sexes.”  Id. at 496 n.20. 
 262  U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”). 
 263  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”). 
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pregnancy.  During her first oral argument, Weddington made this assertion: 
I think the Fourteenth Amendment is equally an appropriate place 
[to find the right to abortion], under the rights of persons to life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. I think that in as far as 
“liberty” is meaningful, that liberty to these women would mean 
liberty from being forced to continue the unwanted pregnancy.264 
Weddington failed to expand effectively on this point, however.  The 
Court had written in 1923 that the liberty interest protected by the Due 
Process Clause includes the freedom “to marry, establish a home and bring 
up children[,]”265 and Weddington was familiar with the case law that came 
after.  At the first oral argument, however, it appeared she could only suggest 
constitutional arguments, rather than actually make them.266 
During the second oral argument, Weddington asserted the individual 
rights argument in more detail: 
The main [constitutional grounds] that we are relying on before 
this Court are the Fifth, Ninth, and the Fourteenth Amendments.  
There’s a great body of precedent. . . . The Court has[,] in the past, 
for example, held that it is the right of parents and of the individual 
to determine whether or not they will send their child to private 
school, whether or not their children will be taught foreign 
languages, whether or not they will have offspring[—]the Skinner 
case[—]whether the right to determine for themselves whom they 
will marry[—]the Loving case[—]and even in Boddie versus 
Connecticut the choice saying that marriage itself is so important 
that the state cannot interfere with termination of a marriage just 
because the woman is unable to pay the cost.  Griswold, of course, 
is the primary case[,] holding that the state could not interfere in 
the question of whether or not a married couple would use birth 
control and, since then, . . . this Court, of course, has held that the 
individual has the right to determine[,] whether they are married 
or single, whether they would use birth control.  So there is a great 
body of cases decided in the past by this Court in the areas of 
marriage, sex, contraception, procreation, childbearing, and 
education of children which says that there are certain things that 
are so much part of the individual concern that they should be left 
to the determination of the individual.267 
Again here, Weddington argues that abortion is an extension of the 
rights already recognized by the Court that allow individuals to make 
decisions about their families.  There is one more logical step Weddington 
 
 264  Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 18:49. 
 265  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 266  See supra text accompanying notes 49–53. 
 267  Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 06:41. 
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could have taken here, but she stops just short: she could have made explicit 
the argument that, if birth control is constitutionally protected so people do 
not become parents if they do not want to, then abortion should be 
constitutionally protected for the same reason.268 
As briefed and argued, the Plaintiffs’ emphasis on individual rights, 
rather than women’s rights, also fits with the equal treatment theory that was 
gaining ground during this era: that women are like men and should be 
treated the same.269  Both male and female humans can be parents—from 
that perspective, there is nothing particularly gendered about the right to 
procreate or the right to have access to birth control, and framing abortion as 
one more option in an individual’s decision to form a family and/or become 
a parent removes the gendered impact of the abortion procedure. 
There is, of course, an obvious hole in this approach, which is that 
pregnancy is experienced exclusively by women, and that unwanted 
pregnancies in particular burden women in a far different way than men.  In 
that sense, Jane Roe was hamstrung by the individual rights and equal 
treatment approaches—the ability to have access to contraception, for 
example, applied to both men and women, meaning every individual could 
potentially make use of the right articulated in Griswold and Eisenstadt.  A 
right to abortion, on the other hand, would not apply to all individuals, only 
women. 
Moreover, in the first oral argument, when Weddington spoke about 
privacy and individual rights, she discussed the impact of the Texas abortion 
law on women exclusively.  During the portion of the argument devoted to 
the vagueness of the statute, she argued that the statute impacted doctors—
universally referred to as “he’s” during the case—but she never discussed 
how the abortion statute affected the individual rights of potential fathers, 
and the Justices did not ask.270  Thus, there was a fundamental disconnect 
between the gender-neutral argument required by the Due Process Clause 
and the gendered impact Weddington was arguing before the Court. 
In both oral arguments, Weddington emphasized the policy rationales 
that supported her position that the abortion statute was bad for women, but 
 
 268  The majority opinion also fails to explain the connection between family planning via 
contraceptives and via abortion.  See Kobylka, supra note 105, at 1091. 
 269  See CHAMALLAS, supra note 239, at 44.  As Weddington argued Roe, equal treatment 
theory was gaining traction in legal spheres.  See Ginsburg, supra note 258, at 377–78 (finding 
the strategy effective).  But see LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 236, at 17 (finding mixed 
results). 
 270  In the final moments of his time at the first oral arguments, Wade advocate, Jay Floyd, 
suggested that “in some instances, a consideration should be given for the father, if he would 
be objective to abortion.”  Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 01:02:13.  The Court did not 
take up this possibility, either at oral argument or in the opinion.  For more on Roe and men, 
see infra Part IV.A.3. 
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her emphasis on the suffering of women would have better supported a 
gender discrimination analysis, rather than a due process argument.  The 
reverse is also true: in making a due process argument, Weddington would 
have done better to emphasize the impact of the Texas abortion law upon 
potential parents, rather than just women. 
2. Ethic of Rights, Ethic of Care 
Cultural feminism as a legal theory had not yet been developed when 
Roe was being litigated, but the oral arguments and the opinion reflect, and 
indeed may have influenced, its underlying framework.  Cultural feminism 
posits that women frame concepts of justice according to an ethic of care, 
“stressing connections and relations with other people[,]” while men 
consider justice according to an ethic of rights, “stressing rules and 
autonomy.”271  As a result of these differences, some scholars conclude that 
“[w]omen’s morality arises from the experience of connection which they 
conceive of as a problem of inclusion rather than one of balancing competing 
claims, whereas men value individual achievement, separation, and 
competition.”272  This theory has been criticized for reinforcing stereotypical 
female domesticity and characterizing women as needing protection,273 and 
it ignores the role of socialization within a patriarchal system on the 
“different” moral and emotional development of boys and girls.274 
In her initial oral argument—fairly criticized for being more of a 
lobbyist pitch than a constitutional analysis275—Weddington utilized 
frequent feminist techniques of storytelling276 and contextual reasoning277 in 
arguing that the Texas abortion statutes were bad for women, and that the 
idea poor women were more likely to carry unwanted pregnancies to term 
was unfair.278  This ethic of care, emphasizing the personal in arriving at a 
concept of justice, did not sit well with the (male) Justices.  During her 
second oral argument, Weddington changed her angle, shifting away from 
story- and policy-based arguments to rights-based arguments more grounded 
in the Constitution: 
 
 
 271  Menkel-Meadow, supra note 248, at 78–79; see also GILLIGAN, supra note 243, at 174 
(“While an ethic of justice proceeds from the premise of equality—that everyone should be 
treated the same—an ethic of care rests on the premise of nonviolence—that no one should 
be hurt.”). 
 272  ANLEU, supra note 249, at 425. 
 273  LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 236, at 18. 
 274  I am grateful to Kyle Velte for this insight. 
 275  EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 6, at 179. 
 276  LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 236, at 50. 
 277  Id. at 44–49. 
 278  See supra text accompanying notes 43–46. 
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Justice Blackmun: Do I get from this, then, that your case depends 
primarily on the proposition that the fetus has no constitutional 
rights? 
Weddington: It depends on saying that the woman has a 
fundamental constitutional right and that the [S]tate has not 
proved any compelling interest for regulation in the area.279 
We are here to advocate that the decision as to whether or not a 
particular woman will continue to carry or will terminate a 
pregnancy is a decision that should be made by that individual.  
That, in fact, she has a constitutional right to make that decision 
for herself and that the [S]tate has shown no [compelling] interest 
in interfering with that decision.280 
I am urging that, in this particular context, this statute is 
unconstitutional that in the Baird v. Eisenstadt case, this Court 
said that if the right of privacy is to mean anything, it is the right 
of the individual, whether married or single, to make 
determinations for themselves.281 
Viewing the oral arguments through the lens of cultural feminism, then, 
suggests that Weddington was more successful arguing a rights-based 
approach to the men on the bench.  The final opinion is defined by its rights-
based analysis: the majority opinion carefully delineates the right of a 
woman to terminate a pregnancy, the fetus’s lack of constitutional rights, and 
the moments at which the state’s interest in protecting maternal health and 
protecting fetal life matures.  Viewed from the vantage point of the majority 
opinion, Weddington’s masculine, ethic of rights-based approach during the 
second oral argument was more effective than her ethic of care-based 
argument the first time. 
Now-Justice Ginsburg has hypothesized that the Roe v. Wade opinion 
created such a firestorm because it “ventured too far in the change it 
ordered[,]”282 and that the trimester framework announced by the Court went 
so far past Appellants’ comparatively modest request to strike down the 
“extreme” Texas statute.283  Through a cultural feminism lens, however, the 
(male) justices may have felt the trimester framework was necessary to 
carefully delineate which party had which rights and when.  Utilizing an 
ethic of rights, the Justices in the majority may have felt it especially 
important to articulate when the state’s two interests (protecting the woman’s 
 
 279  Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 23:19. 
 280  Id. at 01:01:48. 
 281  Id. at 01:03:06. 
 282  Ginsburg, supra note 258, at 376. 
 283  Id. at 385; see also Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 56:02.  Justice White: “I gather 
your argument is that the state may not protect the life of the fetus or prevent an abortion even, 
at any time during pregnancy.  Right up until the moment of birth.”  Weddington: “At this 
time, my point is that this particular statute is unconstitutional.”  Id. 
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health and protecting fetal life) mature.284 
Gilligan did not conclude that men and women inherently reason 
differently; she explicitly declined to analyze whether women’s concern for 
relationships over rights was biological or the result of socialization.285  I am 
skeptical that women inherently reason with an ethic of care, but I theorize 
that our society reasons about women with an ethic of care.286  Women are 
expected to focus on relationships and are indeed frequently defined by their 
relationships—particularly when those women are mothers.287 
Using this perspective, then, the backlash against Roe is explainable not 
because the opinion impresses an ethic of rights onto women who reason 
with an ethic of care.  Instead, the backlash can be traced to the opinion’s 
granting individual rights to pregnant women independent of their 
relationships, particularly their relationship to the fetus.288  The majority 
opinion finds that women have a due process right to choose to terminate a 
pregnancy, but finds that the fetus has no constitutional rights.  The objection 
to this framework may be based, at least in part, in the rejection of the notion 
of a woman having her own rights, separate and apart from her relationships 
to other people, particularly her potential child. 
During oral argument, the advocates reinforce their emphasis on the 
woman’s individual rights or on the woman’s relationship to the fetus.  
Weddington consistently refers to pregnant women, either in the plural or the 
singular, and occasionally refers to Jane Roe as “an unmarried pregnant 
 
 284  Of course, the Justices are justices, and they are supposed to be rights-oriented.  Then 
again, the Constitution and the entire U.S. legal system was designed by men, and the ethic 
of care versus the ethic of rights thesis of cultural feminism suggests that law in the United 
States is naturally rights-based in its reasoning.  This begs the question of what a legal and 
constitutional system would look like if it were based on an ethic of care, emphasizing 
relationships over individual rights. 
 285  GILLIGAN, supra note 243, at 2. 
 286  See ANLEU, supra note 249, at 426.  Anleu suggests that women’s biological potential 
for pregnancy means they have the “experience of connection [which] contrasts with the 
essentially masculine ideals of separation and individuation which underpin modern liberal 
legal theory.  Women’s lives are relational not autonomous; their experience of being human 
is different from that of men.”  Id. (footnote omitted).  While I am unwilling to accept that 
possession of a uterus causes a woman to inherently reason differently, I readily believe that 
possession of a uterus causes women to be socialized and taught differently than men.  I also 
recognize that not every woman has a uterus. 
 287  See GILLIGAN, supra note 243, at 23.  The author concludes that when human 
development is considered only from the vantage point of “man’s life cycle[, which includes] 
the celebration of separation, autonomy, individuation, and natural rights,” the role of a 
woman is “to protect” “the continuing importance of attachment[.]”  Id. 
 288  In the final moments of his time at the first oral arguments, Floyd suggested that “in 
some instances, a consideration should be given for the father, if he would be objective to 
abortion.”  Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 01:02:13.  The Court did not take up this 
possibility, either at oral argument or in the opinion. 
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girl.”289  Floyd and Flowers, arguing for Wade and the State of Texas, both 
consistently refer to pregnant women as “mothers,”290 even though a 
pregnant woman is not typically considered a mother until the child is born—
baby shower cards congratulate the “mother-to-be” rather than the 
“mother.”291  These word choices at oral argument were significant.  By 
calling pregnant women “mothers,” Floyd and Flowers are emphasizing the 
woman’s relationship to the utterly dependent fetus, in an effort to make an 
abortion seem not only like the ending of a life, but as a violence against the 
very role women are expected to play in society—that of caretakers.  Justice 
White, who dissented in Roe, also referred to pregnant women as “mothers” 
several times during the oral arguments.292  Weddington, by contrast, refers 
to the women themselves, referencing pregnancy as a condition affecting the 
individual.  Weddington’s deliberate use of the word “girl” to describe Jane 
Roe is, of course, problematic: at twenty-one years of age, Roe was an adult, 
but referring to her as a “girl” made her sound childlike, victimized, and 
unable to be held responsible for her pregnancy.293 
Thus, much of the Roe oral arguments can be boiled down to a 
discussion of whether the pregnant woman has rights of her own.  The 
majority opinion, written by men as part of a legal system designed by men, 
answers that question in the affirmative.  Granting such a right to a woman 
as an individual, however, defies the powerful social construct of women not 
as individuals, but as nodes in networks of people. 
3. Roe and Men 
Of the various schools of feminist legal theory, dominance theory is 
defined by its emphasis on the difference in power between men and 
women.294  Indeed, “there are real advantages to men in retaining control 
over women. Feminist theorists want to explain why that’s so.”295 
Texas’s abortion law can certainly be viewed as men exercising power 
over women: the male-dominated legislature passed a statute that severely 
restricted women’s access to abortion, effectively forcing women to remain 
 
 289  Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 01:17; Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 01:06.  
The use of the identical phrase “unmarried pregnant girl” during both opening statements 
cannot be accidental. 
 290  E.g., Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 26:20. 
 291  No disparagement is intended toward those women whose pregnancies have ended in 
miscarriage or stillbirth, and who consider themselves mothers to those children. 
 292  E.g., Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 15:53, 31:55, 37:22.  For Justice White’s 
dissent, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 221 (1973). 
 293  For more on the concept of victimhood in abortion law, see infra Part IV.B.1. 
 294  See supra text accompanying notes 251–54. 
 295  Flax, supra note 233, at 82. 
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pregnant and bear unwanted children.296  Weddington characterized the issue 
in the case as “the question of whether or not [women] will be forced by the 
[S]tate to continue an unwanted pregnancy[,]”297 and in later discussing 
unwanted pregnancy as an “injury,” she said, “the women who continue to 
be forced to go through pregnancy have certainly gone through something 
that is irreparable, that can never be changed for them.”298 
Considered more deeply, however, there are two separate instances of 
men exerting power over women in the context of Roe and the Texas 
abortion statute: that of the overwhelmingly male legislature exerting power 
over doctors,299 and the universally male doctors exerting power over 
pregnant women. 
The abortion statute at issue in Roe was a criminal statute directed not 
at women seeking abortions, but at the doctors willing or able to perform 
them.300  In that way, the legislature exerted control over women indirectly, 
by controlling (and limiting) the behavior of doctors.301  During both sets of 
oral arguments, the Justices indicated interest in what the legislature’s 
purpose had been in passing the abortion statute.302  During the second oral 
argument, Justice Stewart stated, “The materials indicate that, generally 
speaking, [abortion statutes are] enacted to protect the health and lives of 
pregnant women because of the danger of operative procedures generally in 
 
 296  See also Flax, supra note 233, at 83 (“Why didn’t the oppression of women disappear 
[in the supposedly classless Soviet Union]?  For one thing, the structure of the family was not 
altered—no efforts were made to change the reproductive sphere.”). 
 297  Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 06:18. 
 298  Id. at 10:03. 
 299  After the completion of the Roe v. Wade oral arguments, Weddington ran for the Texas 
House of Representatives so she could be sure to influence abortion access for women 
irrespective of the case’s outcome.  Telephone interview with Sarah Weddington, Professor 
of History, University of Texas (retired) (Feb. 18, 2018). 
 300  There is an interesting standing dilemma regarding Jane Roe, separate from the rather 
well-known problem of mootness.  Rather, the more nuanced standing problem is that Roe 
was filing suit to challenge a criminal statute she was not subject to.  The statute criminalized 
the doctor’s behavior, not the woman’s.  Texas case law made it very clear that a pregnant 
woman was the victim of an abortion, not the perpetrator, even when she sought, procured, or 
even performed an abortion for herself.  Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 07:48.  The idea 
that women are the victims of criminal abortion statutes is ripe for additional feminist analysis. 
 301  So, too, did the state exert power over women when Dallas County District Attorney, 
Henry Wade, and Assistant District Attorney, John B. Tolle, announced that their office would 
continue to prosecute doctors even though the statute had been declared unconstitutional.  See 
Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at Appendix A; see also Oral Argument II, supra note 
34, at 02:46 (Weddington: “The problem that we face in Texas is that even though we were 
granted a declaratory judgment ruling the law unconstitutional and even though we’ve been 
before this Court once in the past, in Texas, women still are not able to receive abortions from 
licensed doctors because doctors still fear that they will be prosecuted under the statute.”).  
This quote from Weddington also suggests that the Supreme Court’s delay in deciding the 
case is yet another instance of men exerting power over women. 
 302  See supra text accompanying notes 94–96. 
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that era of our history [the late 19th century].”303  Weddington had pointed 
out that if the State’s purpose was the protection of fetal life, it makes no 
sense that a woman who obtains an abortion is not guilty of a crime304 and 
that “the penalty for abortion is determined by whether you have the 
woman’s consent”305—the Texas statute provided that the penalty for 
providing an abortion was doubled “if it be done without her consent.”306 
It is noteworthy that so much of the Roe oral arguments are spent 
discussing the doctors who perform abortions—doctors who are universally 
referred to with male pronouns—and what constraints are placed on the 
doctors’ practice of medicine.  By their questions, the Justices demonstrate 
that they are keenly interested in how the case affects the men who practice 
medicine in Texas and across the United States.  During the second oral 
argument, the first question posed was Chief Justice Burger’s request that 
Weddington clarify whether she was discussing “the prosecutions of 
doctors” under the statute307—no Justice asked a question about women until 
almost sixteen minutes into the argument.308  Justice Blackmun pointedly 
asked during the second rebuttal, “To make sure I get your argument in 
focus, I take it from your recent remarks that you are urging upon us abortion 
on demand of the woman alone, not in conjunction with her physician.”309 
In the second oral argument, Weddington capitalized on the Justices’ 
interest in doctors’ freedom to practice when she pointed out: 
That, in Vuitch, this Court had before it the D.C. statute which 
allowed abortion for the purpose of saving the life or the health, 
and this Court adopted the interpretation that health meant both 
mental and physical health.  And, it seemed to me, the Court’s 
language in that case talked a great deal about the fact that the 
doctor’s judgment goes to saving the health of the woman, that 
that’s the kind of judgment that he is used to making.  In Texas, 
that’s not the judgment he is forced to make.  The judgment in 
Texas is, is this necessary for the purpose of preserving the life of 
the woman?, and the language of that statute has never been 
interpreted.  That’s not the kind of judgment that a doctor is 
accustomed or perhaps even able to make.310 
 
 
 303  Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 54:09. 
 304  Id. at 10:34. 
 305  Id. at 13:22. 
 306  TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1191 (repealed 1973). 
 307  Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 02:40. 
 308  Id. at 15:53 (Justice White: “You’re going to be balancing the rights of the mother 
against the rights of the fetus[?]”). 
 309  Id. at 01:02:51. 
 310  Id. at 18:45. 
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And again: 
Here, it’s the question of whether or not the [S]tate, by the statute, 
will force the woman to continue [a pregnancy].  The woman 
should be given that freedom, just as the doctor has the freedom 
to decide what procedures he will carry out and what he will refuse 
to his patient.311 
Justice Blackmun’s fixation on the Hippocratic Oath is another 
example of the Court’s interest in men’s rights (rather than women’s).  
During the second oral argument, Justice Blackmun demanded to know why 
Weddington had not discussed the Hippocratic Oath in either of her briefs.312  
She replied: “The fact that the medical profession, at one time, had adopted 
the Hippocratic Oath does not weigh upon the fundamental constitutional 
rights involved.  It is a guide for physicians[.]”313  And she was right—
Plaintiff Jane Doe was arguing that the Texas abortion statute infringed on 
her individual right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy, and that the [S]tate 
had not established a compelling interest that would justify the curtailment 
of that right; a statement of medical ethics bears no relation to the 
determination of constitutional rights.  Justice Blackmun could not let the 
point go, however; the final opinion dwelled on the Hippocratic Oath for 
several paragraphs, analyzing it as one type of restriction on the physician’s 
behavior.  Since the Justices and advocates universally refer to doctors with 
male pronouns, the obvious conclusion is that the Court simply cannot 
consider restrictions on women’s behavior independently from restrictions 
on men’s behavior. 
Also noteworthy is the fact that the majority opinion cannot quite grant 
women the individual, autonomous right to abortion—the right is tied to their 
doctors:314 
[F]or the period of pregnancy prior to this “compelling” point, the 
attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to 
determine without regulation by the State, that, in his medical 
judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be terminated.  If that 
decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an 
abortion free of interference by the State.315 
Read in the most cynical way, this language grants women mere 
“consultation” rights regarding their abortions; the right to determine that the 
abortion is warranted is the doctor’s.  As discussed above, this may evidence 
 
 311  Id. at 1:02:38. 
 312  Id. at 20:37. 
 313  Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 21:07. 
 314  Reva B. Siegel, Abortion as a Sex Equality Right: Its Basis in Feminist Theory, in 
MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD 43, 53 
(Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995).  
 315  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (emphasis added). 
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the social tendency to define women in relation to other people,316 but it also 
evidences the Court’s inability to focus exclusively on the rights of women, 
but instead to define the rights of men. 
B. Are Women Individuals or a Collective? 
Despite equal treatment theory’s admonition that “the law should not 
base decisions about individual women on generalizations (even statistically 
accurate ones) about women as a group[,]”317  Weddington frequently cites 
statistics about women and abortion: 
[T]here have been something like 1,600 Texas women who have 
gone to New York City alone for abortions in the first nine months 
of 1971.318 
[T]he overall maternal death rate from legal abortion in New York 
dropped to 3.7 per 100,000 abortions in the last half of 1971, and 
that, in fact, is less than half of the death rate associated with live 
delivery for women.319 
Weddington’s use of both statistics and storytelling320 illustrate a tension in 
the way the Roe advocates, Justices, and opinion consider women: 
sometimes women are grouped together, their experiences made universal, 
while at other times women’s individual situations are paramount. 
1. Victimhood 
Dominance theory has been criticized not only for universalizing the 
white, middle-class female experience, but for framing women collectively 
as victims.321  Certainly, Weddington painted Texas women as victims in 
both oral arguments.322 
Victimhood disempowers women, and pregnant women in particular.  
The Roe Court obviously found that women have a fundamental right to 
choose to terminate a pregnancy, but the idea of pregnant women as victims, 
and thus in need of protection, has not left the abortion debate.  It is this 
mentality that allows legislatures to pass laws requiring twenty-four-hour 
waiting periods before obtaining an abortion323—as if women did not 
understand the gravity of their decision when they first walked in to the 
clinic, but instead need guidance, enlightenment, and protection so as to 
 
 316  See supra text accompanying notes 286–89. 
 317  LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 236, at 16. 
 318  Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 03:35. 
 319  Id. at 05:03. 
 320  See supra text accompanying notes 276–78. 
 321  LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 236, at 25. 
 322  Oral Argument I, supra note 37, at 07:21, 21:16; Oral Argument II, supra note 34, at 
11:26, 12:56. 
 323  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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avoid making a decision they will later regret.324 
2. Decision-making 
The law has frequently struggled with the idea that women are able to 
make meaningful decisions.  “This attitude not only fueled the exclusion of 
women from the jury and the franchise, but also contributed, in the view of 
some scholars, to the efforts of state officials to regulate reproductive 
experience.”325  On the other hand, “[s]ome cultural feminists argue that it is 
precisely because women have such a deep capacity for connection and 
caring that society should trust their independent and morally responsible 
decision-making regarding abortion.”326 
At oral argument, Weddington certainly emphasized the importance of 
pregnant women being able to decide for themselves whether to continue or 
terminate a pregnancy.327  The Court superficially agreed, finding the right 
to privacy “broad enough to encompass [this] decision[,]”328 yet requiring 
this decision to be made together with a doctor.329  The inability to consider 
a woman an autonomous agent subordinates her.330 
V. CONCLUSION 
The oral arguments for Roe v. Wade were a metaphor for the case itself 
and for the nationwide abortion debate it continues to represent— full of 
contradictions. 
Sarah Weddington was the only woman with a microphone, arguing 
against male advocates to an all-male bench.  She argued on behalf of 
women, but could not benefit from the language of gender discrimination in 
asserting her case.  She was by far the best-prepared advocate at the podium, 
but she made little headway with the bench until she argued like a man, 
asserting rights over policy.  Yet within her constitutional arguments, she 
shied away from taking a firm position, fearing alienation of any Justice. 
Like the contradictions within the oral arguments, the opinion is full of 
steps forward and steps back.  The Court ultimately found that the ill-defined 
right to privacy nonetheless included the right to abortion, but denied women 
the autonomy to make that private choice, finding instead that the choice 
 
 324  See generally Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of 
Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991 (2007). 
 325  Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and Women’s Choices, 24 GA. L. REV. 761, 784–85 (1990). 
 326  LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 236, at 141. 
 327  See supra text accompanying note 114. 
 328  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 329  See supra text accompanying notes 314–15. 
 330  Tracy E. Higgins, “By Reason of Their Sex”: Feminist Theory, Postmodernism, and 
Justice, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1536, 1538 (1995). 
CHRISTOPHER (DO NOT DELETE) 12/17/2018  4:04 PM 
352 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:307 
must be made in connection with male doctors. 
What lessons can advocates take away from the lessons of the Roe oral 
arguments?  Are there specific lessons for abortion cases, for women’s 
rights, or for civil rights? 
Perhaps the biggest take-away is that change comes incrementally.  
Weddington made a big ask, seeking a determination by the Court that the 
constitution protected a right to abortion, but she did so by offering a menu 
of possible rationales and implying that they were small extensions of 
existing privacy doctrine.  She did not ask that Roe be the first gender 
discrimination case, and she was right to be conservative there—although 
the Justices found a constitutionally-protected right to abortion, they were 
unwilling to find that right belonging to the woman alone.  Given that the 
Justices felt the need to connect this extension of privacy law to women in 
conjunction with their doctors, it is unlikely the Justices would have found 
this to be the seminal case on gender discrimination. 
The second, more cynical lesson is that women’s rights cannot be 
defined without relating them to the rights of men, though the reverse is not 
true.  Although the Court did not consider the possible rights of fathers, the 
idea of women as autonomous decision makers, defined as individuals rather 
than by their relationships with others, was so unrealistic as to be impossible.  
At oral argument, pregnant women were portrayed as victims, even by 
Weddington herself, requiring the paternal guidance and protection of 
doctors, legislators, and even Justices. 
More broadly, Roe is an example of the Court defining rights in a zero-
sum way.  By carefully articulating the rights of a woman (and her doctor), 
the lack of rights of the fetus, and the interests of the state, and where those 
rights appear and disappear along the timeline of a pregnancy, the Court 
cannot conceive of a constitutional scheme that benefits all actors.  Perhaps 
the next incarnation of a gendered constitutional problem, with female 
advocates and female Justices no longer anomalies in the courtroom, will 
result in a new way of conceptualizing the autonomy of all individuals—
even female ones. 
 
